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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the instant 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (a) (1996). 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the court of appeals, contrary to this Court's 
controlling decision in Springville Citizens and the statutory 
command of the Legislature, erred by concluding that the Payson 
City Council's land use decision is reviewed under a reasonably 
debatable standard of review. On certiorari, this Court does not 
review the decision of the trial court but rather that of the 
court of appeals, which this Court reviews for correction of 
error. Harper v. Summit County, 2001 UT 10 flO (citing State ex 
rel. M.W. and S.W., 2000 UT 79, %8, 12 P.3d 80); see also Landes 
v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1990) (citing 
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988)). 
2. Whether the court of appeals ignored critical record 
evidence in the course of reviewing the City Council's decision 
under the reasonably debatable standard of review. This Court, on 
certiorari, reviews the decision of the court of appeals for 
correction of error. Harper v. Summit County, 2001 UT 10 flO 
(citing State ex rel. M.W. and S.W., 2000 UT 79, %8, 12 P.3d 80); 
see also Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 
1990) (citing Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988)). 
6 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, 
and regulations, whose interpretation is determinative in the 
instant appeal, are set out verbatim, with the appropriate 
citation, in the body and arguments of the instant brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves an adverse land use decision by the Payson 
City Council concerning Plaintiffs' property (also referred to as 
"the Property"), which is governed by The Municipal Land Use 
Development and Management Act set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-
101, et seg. Plaintiffs sought to have their property rezoned 
from the R-l-A residential designation to the R-2-75 higher 
density multi-family zoning designation, which the Payson City 
Council arbitrarily and capriciously denied. 
Plaintiffs initiated this action, claiming the City Council's 
denial of their rezone request was arbitrary and capricious, and 
that the denial constituted a taking without just compensation. 
Thereafter, Payson City Corporation filed a motion for summary 
judgment, demanding that the district court dismiss the complaint 
because the Payson City Council had acted within its legislative 
prerogative. Plaintiffs responded and filed a cross-motion for 
7 
summar ] * ji ldgn tent a rg uing tl lat tl 1 E C!:i t] - C'oi ii ici ] = • leeIsi on \ \ a s 
arbitrary and capricious. 
le :l :i s1 " i < ,i| t - >i ii t expi essed 
concern abcu~ zne lark :f basis 'o deny the rezone requests. The 
district cour: inererore airecuec Payson _.. \,y Corporation to 
prepare findings setting forth the basis of the C-"v Council's 
decisions, which Payson City submitted. 
After oral argument, the district court took the matter under 
advisement. The district court granted Plaintiffs 7 Motion for 
Si in: imai r; • ] i ldg iitent a nd deni ed Pa 5 rson i :• orati on s I lot j ::>n. 
Payson City Corporatic:: filed Notice of Appeal, appealing directly 
..: lou - " : -.^ntl^ ti ai isfer red the 
appeal to the court of appeals. 
i i .. ii, coi irt : f appeals issued an 
officially published Opinion, v;:i -h was for Official Publication, 
reversing the district court's decision. Petitioners filed a 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Payson City Corporation filed 
a Cross-Petition, both of which this Court granted. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. T 1 lis case involves a decision rendered by the court of 
appeals that is in direct conflict with this Court's controlling 
decision in Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City of 
8 
Springville, 1999 UT 25, 979 P. 2d 332, and the statutory command 
of the Legislature. The conflict created by the court of appeals 
revolves around the standard of review to be utilized in reviewing 
a municipality's land use decision. Cf. Harmon City v. Draper 
City, 2000 UT App 31, 997 P.2d 321. 
2. The land use decision at issue in this case concerns 
property in Payson City, Utah, that is located within an area 
zoned as R-l-A, which is a low density residential zone (R. 70-71; 
R. 79, 1J2) . The subject property, which is located west of 
Interstate 15, is surrounded by property also designated as R-l-A 
for residential use (R. 42) ,x Two and one-half blocks east of the 
Property is a large, expansive piece of property that is 
designated as R-2-75, which is the same zoning designation 
requested by Petitioners (Id.). 
3. The 1995 Payson City General Plan states that 
residential areas should be encouraged to locate east of the 1-15 
buffer, and that zoning ordinances that utilize 1-15 as a buffer 
should be enacted (R. 50; R. 52).2 However, the Official Payson 
1The Payson Planning Zone Map in the record on appeal reveals 
that this R-2-75 property abutting the subject property is located on 
both the west and east sides of 1-15 (R. 42, Payson Planning Zone 
Map) . 
2The Payson City General Plan also establishes the policy of 
providing for a "mixture of residential densities" by zoning 
"locations for low, medium, and high density housing." (See R. 51, 
Payson City General Plan 1995) . 
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C i t y Gene ... w a s a d o p t e ::i :i ] i II 9 95 p ro^ r i de s f : i : 
large areas of residential use west of 1-15 (R. 4 3 ) , 
4 . 11 i «J anuary 19 96, P] aii it if f s applies I la : • t : ezoi le tl lei i: 
property from R-l-A to R-2-75, which :i s a residential zoning 
designation that permits multiple family dwellings (R 1 ' 77 78) , 
Thereafter, during a meeting before the Planning Commission on the 
rezone application, the Chairperson acknowledged that because 
'"there a:i :• = a ] ready Dther resd denti a] deve] opments 
surrounding area where this rezone wou. ^  j • ^ Ke z^ace, rhere may not 
be a probl e rn :i n i ezoni i lg tl ] i s tc R 2 ! * 67) . 
BY w aY °f a Planning Commission Staff Report, the Staff 
i: ecoi amended that tl i = P] ai n i:i i ig C DX i imissioi i i econi i: tend approva ] t: :: tl: i = 
Payson City Council of Plaintiffs'' R-2-75 rezone application (R. 
173) , 
6. At the public hearing on Plaintiffs'' rezone application 
before the Planning Commission, a petition signed by thirty-eight 
people was submitted by a neighborhood group that opposed the 
zoning change (R. 153-55; R, 159-60) P addition, thirteen 
:i nd :i |; d di :i a] s at the hear: ng expressed the:i i: c ppos:i t:i oi i t :: the R 2 -
75 rezone (R. 154-55). After public comment, the Commission 
recoi amended tl iat the Paysoi l C:i ta / C'oi n: i c:i ] d ei a « t l le R 2 7 5 rezone 
(R. 153) . 
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7. After the Planning Commission adjourned, the Payson City 
Council held a public hearing on the R-2-75 rezone application, at 
which time the Planning and Zoning Chairperson informed the City 
Council that the Planning Commission had just met "and after 
considering the public input, voted to deny the zone change." (R. 
231-33) .3 
8. The same thirty-eight signature Petition was submitted 
to the City Council, and, subject to one or two exceptions, the 
same individuals appeared before the City Council as did before 
the Planning Commission (R. 232-33). One exception was Mr. Jim 
Wilbert, an expert with twenty years of planning experience, who 
spoke in favor of the rezone because it "allows for affordable 
housing near the industrial park." (R. 232). 
9. The City Council voted to deny the R-2-75 rezone "based 
on the General Plan recommendation, traffic concerns relating to 
the industrial park, and [the Planning Commission's] 
recommendation." (R. 231). 
10. Plaintiffs submitted a second Zoning Change Application, 
requesting that their property be rezoned from R-l-A to R-l-9 (R. 
145; R. 334, %3) . Both the Planning Commission Staff and the 
According to an Interoffice Memo from the Planning Commission 
to the City Council, "The Planning Commission recommendation to the 
City Council was to not approve the [R-2-75] zone change because of 
the opposition of the neighbors in that area." (R. 110-11) (Emphasis 
added). 
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Planning Commission recommended approval of the R-l-9 rezone (R. 
140/ R. 122-23). After a public hearing, the City Council denied 
the R-l-9 rezone request (R. 222-23). 
11. Plaintiffs appealed the Payson City Council's denials of 
their rezone requests by filing a Verified Complaint in district 
court, alleging the Payson City Council's denials of their rezone 
requests were arbitrary and capricious, and that the denials 
constituted a taking without just compensation. (R. 2-16) . Payson 
City Corporation filed a motion for summary judgment, requesting 
that the district court dismiss the complaint because the Payson 
City Council had acted within its legislative prerogative (R. 33-
79) . 
12. Plaintiffs responded by filing a cross-motion for 
summary judgment, arguing that the City Council's decisions were 
arbitrary and capricious (R. 86-191). 
13. At a hearing on the motions, the district court 
expressed concern about the lack of basis in the minutes of the 
public hearings to deny the rezone request (R. 445). The district 
court directed Payson City Corporation to prepare findings, 
setting forth the basis of the City Council's decisions to deny 
the rezone (R. 282) . 
14. The City subsequently submitted findings to the court 
that were substantially identical to the minutes in terms of 
12 
establishing the basis for the City Council's denials of the 
rezone request (R. 285-334) . 
15. After oral argument, the district court took the matter 
under advisement (R. 446). The district court issued a decision 
reversing the City Council's denial of Plaintiffs' R-2-75 rezone 
application, determining that the denial was arbitrary and 
capricious because the denial had no evidentiary support (R. 342) . 
Consequently, the district court did not address the denial of 
Plaintiffs' second rezone application (R. 341-43, Memorandum 
Decision, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as 
Addendum D). 
16. Payson City Corporation appealed to this Court, after 
which this Court transferred the appeal to the court of appeals 
pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 44. 
17. On January 11, 2 001, the court of appeals issued an 
Opinion (For Official Publication) , in which it reversed the 
district court's decision. See Bradley v. Payson City Corp., 2001 
UT App. 9, 17 P. 3d 1160, a true and correct copy of which is 
attached hereto as Addendum B. 
18. The Petitioners, Mr. Robert Bradley, et al. , filed a 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Payson City Corporation filed 
a Cross-Petition for Writ of Certiorari, both of which this Court 
granted (See Order granting Petition and Cross-Petition for Writ 
13 
of Certiorari, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto 
as Addendum E) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. According to Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(3), "The courts 
shall: (a) presume that land use decisions and regulations are 
valid; and (b) determine only whether or not the decision is 
arbitrary, capricious, or illegal." In Springville Citizens for 
a Better Community v. City of Springville, 1999 UT 25, 979 P.2d 
332, this Court took the broad and plain language of Utah Code 
Ann. § 10-9-1001 at face value, questioning not whether the Utah 
Legislature somehow intended that two different standards of 
judicial review are to be derived from the single and simple 
standard set forth in the statute. In the course of refusing to 
distinguish between administrative and legislative functions, this 
Court, without reservation, unanimously accepted the Legislature's 
plain language and thereby made the "sweeping statement" that w[a] 
municipality's land use decision is arbitrary and capricious if it 
is not supported by substantial evidence." 
By refusing to follow this Court's controlling decision in 
Springville Citizens and the statutory command of the Legislature, 
the court of appeals erred by concluding that the City Council's 
land use decision is to be reviewed under a reasonably debatable 
14 
standard of review. By so holding, the court of appeals refused 
to follow the controlling interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-
1001(3) set forth in Springville Citizens and thereby interpreted 
it to mean something other than the clear pronouncement 
specifically set forth in both the statute and this Court's 
opinion. 
2. Even under the "reasonably debatable" standard of 
judicial review, the City Council's denial of Plaintiffs7 R-2-75 
rezone application was arbitrary and capricious. Based on the 
record of this case, including the undisputed facts, the City 
Council's decision was arbitrary and capricious because it was not 
supported by evidence that makes the reasonableness of the denial 
of the R-2-75 rezone application reasonably or fairly debatable. 
The court of appeals failed to recognize that based on the 
dearth of evidence before the City Council, there was nothing to 
support the reasonableness of the denial of the R-2-75 rezone 
application. For example, the court of appeals refused to 
recognize that not only were the reasons given by the City Council 
for denying Plaintiffs' rezone request totally lacking in 
evidentiary support, those reasons, in many ways, directly 
contradict the record facts and circumstances surrounding the R-2-
75 rezone request. Immediately following the public hearing on 
the R-2-75 rezone request, the City Council voted to deny the R-2-
15 
75 rezone based on the General Plan recommendation, traffic 
concerns relating to the industrial park, and the Planning 
Commission's recommendation. In light of the evidence in the 
record, or essentially the total lack thereof, a reasonable mind 
could not reach the same conclusion as that of the City Council in 
the instant case. 
In direct contradiction to the Payson City General Plan, the 
Official Payson City General Plan Map, which was adopted within 
months of City Council's denial, expressly provides for large 
areas of residential use west of 1-15. The subject R-2-75 
application permits residential and density usage totally 
compatible with three of the four abutting properties or 
communities and an overall density that is consistent with the 
large and expansive multi-family neighborhood areas directly to 
the east of the Property. 
The court of appeals also refused to recognize that by citing 
"traffic concerns relating to the industrial park" as a reason to 
deny the R-2-75 rezone application, the City Council ignored the 
fact that the record is completely devoid of any evidence before 
it, credible or otherwise, that the requested R-2-75 zone would 
adversely impact traffic. The sole contrary evidence in the 
record were unsupported assertions by citizens with no known 
experience or training in the traffic engineering or planning 
16 
fields. In contrast, Mr. Jim Wilbert, an expert with twenty years 
of planning experience, studied the proposed rezone and then 
appeared before the City Council, speaking in favor of the rezone 
because it "allows for affordable housing near the industrial 
park." 
The court of appeals also ignored the City Council's mistaken 
reliance upon the Planning Commission's recommendation as a reason 
to deny the R-2-75 rezone application inasmuch as the basis upon 
which the Planning Commission's recommendation was based was 
equally, if not more so, factually deficient than that of the City 
Council's. After studying Plaintiffs' R-2-75 rezone application, 
the Planning Commission's own staff, by way of a Staff Report, 
dated March 20, 1996, recommended that the Planning Commission 
recommend approval to the Payson City Council of Plaintiffs' R-2-
75 rezone application. Poised to recommend approval, the Planning 
Commission instead recommended that the Payson City Council deny 
the R-2-75 rezone after hearing the public comments. An 
Interoffice Memo from the Planning Commission to the City Council 
revealingly states, "The Planning Commission recommendation to the 
City Council was to not approve the [R-2-75] zone change because 
of the opposition of the neighbors in that area." Consequently, 
any reliance by the City Council on the Planning Commission's 
recommendation was factually unfounded and fallacious. 
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The court of appeals failed to consider that public input is 
only part of the information to be considered by the City Council 
prior to approving or denying a rezone application. Consequently, 
the court of appeals either failed or refused to recognize that 
the record indisputably reveals that the City Council almost 
exclusively relied upon public comment in the course of denying 
Plaintiffs7 R-2-75 rezone application. The reasons provided by 
the City Council for its denial were in direct contradiction to 
the actual facts and circumstances surrounding the proposed 
rezone. Therefore, the reasonableness of the City Council's 
decision was not even "fairly debatable." 
ARGUMENTS 
I. A MUNICIPALITY'S LAND USE DECISION IS ARBITRARY 
AND CAPRICIOUS IF IT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
A. Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(3) and Springville 
Citizens. 
Prior to 1991, there existed extensive Utah case law 
expressing different standards of judicial review for 
administrative and legislative land use decisions.4 
Notwithstanding that extensive case law, the Utah Legislature in 
4See Hairmon City, Inc. v. Draper City, 2 000 UT App 31, f8 n.5; 
997 P. 2d 321 (comparing Marshall v. Salt Lake City, 105 Utah 111, 141 
P.2d 704, 705-06 (1943), with Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment of Salt 
Lake City, 685 P.2d 1032, 1035 (Utah 1984)) . A true and correct copy 
of the Harmon case is attached hereto as Addendum C. 
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1991 enacted a uone-size-fits-all standard of review" for 
"municipality [] land use decisions77 when it enacted what is now 
known as Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001.5 See Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-
1001(3) (b) (1999); Harmon City, Inc. v. Draper City, 2000 UT App 
31, 1[44 (Jackson, J, dissenting) . According to Utah Code Ann. § 
10-9-1001(3), "The courts shall: (a) presume that land use 
decisions and regulations are valid; and (b) determine only 
whether or not the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal." 
In Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City of 
Springville, 1999 UT 25, 979 P. 2d 332,6 this Court took the broad 
and plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 at face value, 
questioning not whether the Utah Legislature somehow intended that 
two different standards of judicial review are to be derived from 
the single and simple standard set forth in the statute. Id. at 
m(22-25.7 In the course of refusing to distinguish between 
5Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 governs appeals and enforcement of 
municipal land use decisions. 
6A true and correct copy of this Court's opinion in Springville 
Citizens for a Better Community v. City of Springville, 1999 UT 25, 
979 P.2d 332, is attached hereto as Addendum A. 
7This Court's reading in Springville Citizens of the standard of 
review set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(3) is consistent with 
well-established rules of statutory construction. See Wilson v. 
Valley Mental Health, 969 P.2d 416, 418 (Utah 1998) (appellate court 
looks first to plain language "as the best indicator of the 
legislature's intent and purpose in passing the statute"); Salt Lake 
Child & Family Therapy Clinic, Inc. v. Frederick, 890 P.2d 1017, 1019 
(Utah 1995) (statute should generally be construed according to its 
19 
administrative and legislative functions, this Court, without 
reservation, unanimously accepted the Legislature's plain language 
and thereby made the "sweeping statement" that * [a] municipality's 
land use decision is arbitrary and capricious if it is not 
supported by substantial evidence." See id. at f24, 979 P.2d at 
336 (citing Patterson v. Utah County Bd. of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 
602, 604 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)). 
B. By Refusing to follow this Court's 
Controlling Decision in Springville Citizens 
and the Statutory Command of the Legislature, 
the Court of Appeals Erred by Concluding that 
the City Council's Land Use Decision is to be 
Reviewed Under a Reasonably Debatable 
Standard of Review. 
The court of appeals, in the instant case, held that the 
reasonably debatable standard of review is to be utilized in 
reviewing the City Council's land use decision of denying 
Petitioners' R-2-75 rezone application. See Bradley v. Payson 
City Corp., 2001 UT 9, ff12-17, 17 P.3d 1160. By so concluding, 
the court of appeals refused to follow this Court's controlling 
interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(3) set forth in 
Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City of 
Springville, 1999 UT 25, 979 P. 2d 332, and thereby interpreted it 
plain language) ; Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth, 779 P. 2d 685, 686 (Utah 
1989) (same); Savage Indus., Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d 
664, 670 (Utah 1991) (statutory words are to be read literally unless 
such a reading is unreasonably confused or inoperable); Murphy v. 
Crosland, 886 P.2d 74, 80 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (same). 
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to mean something other than the clear pronouncement specifically 
set forth in both the statute and the Court's opinion.8 
Consequently, the court of appeals' legal conclusion that the 
reasonably debatable standard of review is to be utilized in 
reviewing the City Council's land use decision is in direct 
conflict with both the Legislature's statutory command and this 
Court's decision in Springville Citizens. See id.; see also Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 (3) .9 
II. EVEN ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE "REASONABLY 
DEBATABLE" STANDARD OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IS 
APPLICABLE, THE RECORD REVEALS THAT THE CITY 
COUNCIL'S DENIAL OF PLAINTIFFS' R-2-75 REZONE 
APPLICATION WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS. 
A. The "Reasonably Debatable" Standard of 
Judicial Review. 
Even under the "reasonably debatable7' standard of judicial 
review such as that set forth in Smith Inv. Co. v. Sandy City, 958 
P.2d 245, 252 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), the City Council's denial of 
8The majority in the instant case attempted to explain away and 
diminish this Court's clear pronouncement in Springville Citizens by 
stating that this Court "merely stated that a municipality's land use 
decisions . . . are arbitrary and capricious when not supported by 
substantial evidence." See Bradley v. Payson City Corp., 2001 UT App 
9, fl3, 17 P.3d 1160 (emphasis added); see also Bradley, 2001 UT App 
9, f45, 17 P.3d 1160 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
9See Bradley v. Payson City Corp., 2001 UT App 9, f^f41-47, 17 
P.3d 1160 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (discussing in detail the 
majority's failure to abide by principles of vertical stare decisis 
in light of this Court's clear command in Springville Citizens by 
inappropriately relying of horizontal stare decisis). 
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Plaintiffs' R-2-75 rezone application was arbitrary and 
capricious. In the Smith Investment case, the court of appeals 
stated, "[I]f an ordinance 'could promote the general welfare; or 
even if it is reasonably debatable that it is in the interest of 
the general welfare' we will uphold it." Id. (quoting Marshall v. 
Salt Lake City, 105 Utah 111, 121, 141 P.2d 704, 709 (1943) and 
citing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388, 
47 S.Ct. 114, 118 (1926)); see also 3 Edward H. Ziegler, Jr., 
Rathkopf's The Law of Zoning & Planning § 27A.03, at 27A-15 (1997) 
(phrasing inquiry as whether "the reasonableness of the action is 
vfairly debatable'"). 
B. The Court of Appeals Ignored Significant 
Inconsistencies and Critical Record Evidence 
in the Course of Applying the "Reasonably 
Debatable" Standard of Review• 
Based on the record of this case, including the undisputed 
facts, the City Council's decision was arbitrary and capricious 
because it was not supported by evidence that makes the 
reasonableness of the denial of the R-2-75 rezone application 
reasonably or fairly debatable. The court of appeals failed to 
recognize that based on the dearth of evidence before the City 
Council, there was nothing to support the reasonableness of the 
denial of the R-2-75 rezone application. The record reveals that 
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the almost total lack of evidence precludes the City Council's 
decision from being reasonably or fairly debatable. 
The court of appeals refused to recognize that not only were 
the reasons given by the City Council for denying Plaintiffs' 
rezone request totally lacking in evidentiary support, those 
reasons were in many ways in direct contradiction to the record 
facts and circumstances surrounding the R-2-75 rezone request. 
For example, immediately following the public hearing on the R-2-
75 rezone request, the City Council voted to deny the R-2-75 
rezone "based on the General Plan recommendation, traffic concerns 
relating to the industrial park, and [the Planning Commission's] 
recommendation." (See R. 231). In light of the evidence in the 
record, or essentially the total lack thereof, a reasonable mind 
could not reach the same conclusion as that of the City Council in 
the instant case. 
The court of appeals ignored the City Council's total lack of 
consistency and due consideration when it denied the R-2-75 rezone 
request "based on the General Plan recommendation" (Id.). In 
direct contradiction to the Payson City General Plan (see R. 50 
and 52) , the Official Payson City General Plan Map, which was 
adopted within months of City Council's denial, expressly provides 
for large areas of residential use west of 1-15 (See R. 43, 
Official General Plan Map). The subject R-2-75 application 
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permits residential and density usage totally compatible with 
three of the four abutting properties or communities and an 
overall density that is consistent with the large and expansive 
multi-family neighborhood areas directly to the east of the 
Property (See R. 42, Payson Planning Zone Map). 
The court of appeals also refused to recognize that by citing 
"traffic concerns relating to the industrial park" as a reason to 
deny the R-2-75 rezone application, the City Council ignored the 
fact that the record is completely devoid of any evidence before 
it, credible or otherwise, that the requested R-2-75 zone would 
adversely impact traffic (See R. 342, Memorandum Decision, %3) . 
The sole contrary evidence in the record were unsupported 
assertions by citizens with no known experience or training in the 
traffic engineering or planning fields (See R. 231-33, Payson City 
Council Meeting Minutes, March 20, 1996). That evidence is hardly 
the evidence upon which a reasonable mind would reasonably or 
fairly rely for purposes of denying a rezone application, see 
Springville Citizens For a Better Community v. City of 
Springville, 1999 UT 25, f24, 979 P. 2d 332, particularly when 
viewed in light of the fact that the Planning Commission Staff had 
previously recommended that the Planning Commission recommend 
approval of the rezone application (See R. 173, Planning 
Commission Staff Report). Cf. Davis County v. Clearfield, 756 
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P.2d 704, 712 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (stating, in conditional use 
permit case using arbitrary and capricious - substantial evidence 
standard of review, that wx [c]itizen opposition is a consideration 
which must be weighed, but cannot be the sole basis for the 
decision to deny'" and local government entity "'must rely on 
facts, and not mere emotion or local opinion'" (citations 
omitted)). Contrastingly, Mr. Jim Wilbert, an expert with twenty 
years of planning experience, studied the proposed rezone and then 
appeared before the City Council, speaking in favor of the rezone 
because it "allows for affordable housing near the industrial 
park." (See R. 232). 
Moreover, the court of appeals ignored the City Council's 
mistaken reliance upon the Planning Commission's recommendation as 
a reason to deny the R-2-75 rezone application inasmuch as the 
basis upon which the Planning Commission's recommendation was 
based was equally, if not more so, factually deficient than that 
of the City Council's. After studying Plaintiff's R-2-75 rezone 
application, the Planning Commission's own staff, by way of a 
Staff Report, dated March 20, 1996, recommended that the Planning 
Commission recommend approval to the Payson City Council of 
Plaintiffs' R-2-75 rezone application (See R. 173, Planning 
Commission Staff Report). During a Planning Commission Meeting on 
February 8, 1996, when Plaintiffs' R-2-75 rezone application came 
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before the Commission (See R. 166-67, Payson Planning Commission 
Meeting Minutes, February 8, 1996), Chairperson Stewart readily 
acknowledged that because "there are already other residential 
developments in the surrounding area where this rezone would take 
place, there may not be a problem in rezoning this to R-2-7500." 
(See id.) . Poised to recommend approval, the Planning Commission 
instead recommended that the Payson City Council deny the R-2-75 
rezone after hearing the public comments (See R. 153-55, Payson 
City Planning Commission Meeting Minutes, March 20, 1996). The 
explanation for the Planning Commission's recommendation became 
apparent through an Interoffice Memo from the Planning Commission 
to the City Council, which states, "The Planning Commission 
recommendation to the City Council was to not approve the [R-2-75] 
zone change because of the opposition of the neighbors in that 
area." (See R. Ill, Interoffice Memo). Consequently, it is 
readily apparent that any reliance by the City Council on the 
Planning Commission's recommendation was factually unfounded and 
fallacious. 
Petitioners acknowledge that the City Council appropriately 
held a public hearing and allowed interested parties to provide 
their ideas and opinions on the proposed rezone. However, the 
court of appeals failed to consider that public input is only part 
of the information to be considered by the City Council prior to 
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approving or denying a rezone application. In Gayland v. Salt 
Lake County, 11 Utah 2d 307, 358 P.2d 633 (1961), which was a 
zoning case, this Court stated: 
[I]t is entirely appropriate to hold public 
hearings and to allow any interested parties 
it desires to give information and to present 
their ideas on the matter. But this is by no 
means the only source from which the 
commissioners may obtain such information. 
From the fact that they hold public offices 
it is to be assumed that they have wide 
knowledge of the various conditions and 
activities in the county bearing on the 
question of proper zoning, such as the 
location of businesses, schools, roads and 
traffic conditions, growth in population and 
housing, the capacity of utilities, the 
existing classification of surrounding 
property, and the effect that the proposed 
reclassification may have on these things and 
upon the general orderly development of the 
county. In performing their duty it is both 
their privilege and obligation to take into 
consideration their own knowledge of such 
matters and also to gather available 
pertinent information from all possible 
sources and give consideration to it in 
making their determination. 
Id. at 63 6 (Emphasis added). 
The court of appeals either failed or refused to recognize 
that the record indisputably reveals that the City Council almost 
exclusively relied upon public comment in the course of denying 
Plaintiffs' R-2-75 rezone application. Moreover, the reasons 
provided by the City Council for its denial were in direct 
contradiction to the actual facts and circumstances surrounding 
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the proposed rezone. Hence, the reasonableness of the City 
Council's decision, as demonstrated by the foregoing, was not even 
"fairly debatable." 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Petitioners, Mr. Robert Bradley, et 
al., respectfully ask that this Court reverse the court of appeals 
published Opinion and remand the case pursuant to the instructions 
of this Court and for any other relief the Court deems just and 
appropriate under the circumstances. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of December, 2001. 
QGGINS, P.C. 
Attorneyship Petitioners 
and Cross-Respondents 
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Mr. Jody K Burnett 
Williams & Hunt 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake Cit^r-UT 84145-5678 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
— 0 0 O 0 0 - — 
Springville Citizens for a Better Community, including Leland and LaJean Davies, Keith 
and Joanne Haeffele, Michael and Linda Krau, Blaine and Shirley Robertson, Brian and Marsha 
Ryder, and Russel and Nancy Weiser, and High Line Ditch Water Users, including Bryan and 
Belinda Adams, Bert and Debra Bartholomew, Lynn and Maxine Bartholomew, Darrell and Dorothy 
Bickmore, Merlene Bona, Carl and Rebecca Burrows, Donald and Debra Bushman, Walter and 
Manita Fowler, David and Ruth Fuller, Donald and Laura Gage, Michael and 
LaRae Hill, Dale and Melba Jarman, Glendon and Leila C. Johnson, Linda Powers, 
Blaine and Shirley Robertson, Ronald and Utawna Witney, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
The City of Springville, a municipality under Utah law (aka Springville City, 
a municipal corporation or Springville City, a municipality), 
Mayor Hal Wing, in his official capacity, and John and Jane Does I-XV, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 980028 
F I L E D 
March 19, 1999 
1999 UT 25 
Fourth District, Utah County 
The Honorable Anthony W. Schofield 
Attorneys: 
Matthew Hilton, Springville, for plaintiffs 
Jody K. Burnett, Salt Lake City, for defendants 
RUSSON. Justice: 
f 1 This action arises from a land use decision made by Springville City, granting T. Roger Peay 
approval to develop a Planned Unit Development ("P.U.D."). Plaintiffs, owners of property 
neighboring the P.U.D., filed suit against the City challenging the P.U.D.'s approval. The district 
court granted summary judgment in favor of the City. We reverse the district court's grant of 
summary judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
FACTS 
Tf2 Roger Peay sought approval to develop a P.U.D. in the foothills of Springville, Utah. To obtain 
approval, Peay had to follow the procedure outlined in the Springville City ordinances. See 
Springville City Code §§ 11-4-304, 11-4-202. These ordinances require P.U.D. applicants to submit 
numerous documents regarding the proposed development. A process then commences in which first 
the city planning commission and then the city council review the development plans, with each 
entity imposing modifications and conditions, if necessary, on those plans. The council is authorized 
to grant final P.U.D. approval, which is evidenced by the adoption of an ordinance amending the 
City's zoning map. 
Tf3 On July 11, 1995, Peay appeared before the planning commission seeking sketch plan approval 
for a thirty-three-acre, forty-eight-lot P.U.D. called Powerhouse Mountain Estates. Between July of 
1995 and May of 1996, Peay attended five planning commission meetings and three city council 
meetings. At each meeting, Peay sought either sketch plan approval or preliminary approval for the 
P.U.D. On each occasion, the commission and the council imposed modifications on Peay's plans in 
order to meet the City's P.U.D. requirements. There was considerable public participation at these 
meetings, including input from those who are plaintiffs herein. Ultimately, the council rejected Peay's 
proposal. 
Tf4 On May 28, 1996, Peay started anew before the planning commission. In response to the 
previously expressed concerns of the council and the commission, the proposed P.U.D. now 
consisted of thirty-five lots, contained no "deep lots," provided for curbs and gutters on each side of 
the P.U.D. road and a sidewalk on the downhill side of the road, and provided for an entrance road 
forty-six feet wide and an interior road forty-one feet wide. The commission voted to give the P.U.D. 
sketch plan approval and to recommend approval of the preliminary plan. 
^5 Thereafter, on July 16, 1996, Peay sought city council approval for the P.U.D. After extended 
public comment, the council voted four to one to give the P.U.D. preliminary approval subject to 
twenty-nine conditions. On September 10, 1996, Peay then appeared before the planning commission 
seeking final approval for the P.U.D., which was now called Stonebury Estates. The commission 
reviewed the twenty-nine conditions and, contrary to the city code, voted to send the matter to the 
council without a recommendation, positive or negative. 
f 6 In a letter to the city attorney dated September 19, 1996, Peay detailed the specific actions he 
had taken in response to the twenty-nine conditions. On September 30, 1996, the city attorney 
submitted to the mayor and the city council his review of Peay's compliance with the conditions. He 
opined that Peay had not complied with many aspects of the conditions and that final approval should 
therefore be withheld. 
Tf7 On October 1, 1996, Peay sought final approval from the council for what he called the "first 
phase" of the P.U.D., which consisted of seventeen of the thirty-five lots. After a detailed discussion 
of each of the conditions imposed, the council voted to meet with Peay for a work session, the 
purpose of which was to evaluate Peay's compliance with the conditions. 
1f8 Prior to the work session, at the council's request, Peay responded in writing to the city 
attorney's concerns and conclusions regarding the twenty-nine conditions. Thereafter, with this 
information before it, the council concluded that sixteen conditions had been met entirely, seven 
conditions had been met partially or were ready to be met, and six conditions required council action. 
These six conditions were the focus of the work session. 
[^9 On October 15, 1996, the council then voted to adopt nine additional conditions, which 
modified some of the previous twenty-nine conditions. Among other things, these additional 
conditions (1) allowed the thirty-five-lot P.U.D. to be developed in phases, (2) allowed four of the 
lots to have less than 20,000 square feet but not less than 17,000 square feet, (3) required Peay to 
cover the highline ditch through the entire development, and (4) provided that the homeowners' 
association would own the spring protection area as a common area. Peay agreed to comply with all 
nine conditions. The council, however, did not refer these additional conditions to the commission for 
its review, recommendation, or approval, as mandated by the city code. 
f 10 At a council meeting on November 5,1996, Peay sought final approval for the seventeen lots 
comprising the first phase of the P.U.D. After more discussion of the conditions, the council voted to 
give the first phase "tentative final approval." Then, on November 11, 1996, the council adopted 
ordinance 19-96, which amended the City's zoning map and gave final approval to the first phase of 
the P.U.D. This ordinance specifically required compliance with "approved plans, plats, documents, 
conditions of approval and agreements." Peay ultimately complied with all the conditions imposed by 
the council. 
f 11 Plaintiffs thereafter commenced this action against the City in district court, challenging the 
council's approval of the P.U.D. pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001, which states: 
Any person adversely affected by any decision made in the exercise of the provisions of 
this chapter may file a petition for review of the decision with the district court within 30 
days after the local decision is rendered. 
The courts shall: 
(a) presume that land use decisions and regulations are valid; 
and 
(b) determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, 
capricious, or illegal. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(2) & (3) (1996) (emphasis added). 
f 12 Plaintiffs alleged that the City's approval of the P.U.D. was arbitrary, capricious, and illegal 
because the City failed to strictly follow its own ordinances, which, under the City's own code, were 
mandatory. Plaintiffs also alleged violations of state statutory requirements and of the state and 
federal constitutions. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief and monetary damages. 
TJ13 After conducting discovery, the City moved for summary judgment. The district court held that 
the City had substantially complied with the ordinances governing approval of the P.U.D. and, on 
that basis, granted the City's motion for summary judgment. This appeal followed. 
f 14 On appeal, plaintiffs argue that summary judgment was improper because the City's decision to 
approve the P.U.D. was arbitrary, capricious, and illegal.^- According to plaintiffs, the decision was 
illegal because the City failed to comply strictly with several of the ordinances governing P.U.D. 
approval, many of which include the terms "shall" and "must." Plaintiffs emphasize that under the 
City's own statutory standard of interpretation, the "[w]ords 'shall1 and 'must1 are always mandatory." 
Springville City Code § 11-10-101(4). Plaintiffs claim that a number of such mandatory procedures 
outlined as subsections of City Code § 11-4-202 were not satisfied by the City, as well as several 
other mandatory requirements concerning P.U.D. improvements and documentation under City Code 
§§ 11-4-301 to-308. 
f 15 In addition, plaintiffs contend that the City violated City Code § 11-5-7(4), which states that 
the "Planning Commission shall not approve any preliminary plat for any subdivision" unless the 
irrigation company or persons entitled to use the irrigation ditches "certify that the drawing [showing 
the location of all irrigation ditches] is a true and accurate representation." (Emphasis added.) 
Plaintiffs argue that this ordinance was violated when such a certification had not been made prior to 
the commission's granting the P.U.D. preliminary approval or considering its final approval. 
1fl6 Plaintiffs further assert that the City ran afoul of City Code § 11-5-9, which provides, "The 
Planning Commission shall review the final plat, final engineering drawings and documents, and 
shall act to approve the plan [or] disapprove the plan," and Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-204(5), which 
states, "The planning commission shal l . . . (5) recommend approval or denial of subdivision 
applications as provided in this chapter." (Emphasis added.) Plaintiffs argue that the commission 
violated this ordinance and statute when, after reviewing the plans submitted for final approval, it 
voted simply to send the matter to the council without a recommendation, either positive or negative. 
Plaintiffs contend that the lack of such a recommendation cannot be construed as an implicit approval 
of the plans because certain amendments to those plans did not exist at the time and, after the 
amendments were made, the plans were not remanded to the commission for its review. 
f 17 Plaintiffs also argue that the City breached section 11-5-10 of its code, which states, "If 
modifications are required [by the city council], such modifications must be referred to the Planning 
Commission and be approved by the Commission." (Emphasis added.) Plaintiffs assert that this 
ordinance was violated when the additional nine conditions imposed by the council on October 15, 
1996, were not sent to the commission for its review, recommendation, or approval. 
Tfl 8 In addition to these alleged violations, plaintiffs charge that the City violated certain provisions 
of state statutory law. They claim the City breached Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-9-703 and 10-9-707(2)(a) 
by, in essence, granting variances which, under these statutes, should have been decided by the board 
of adjustments. Plaintiffs also posit that the City allowed certain plats to be recorded in violation of 
both Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-81 l(l)(b) and some of the conditions of approval imposed on the 
P.U.D., such as the requirement of eliminating flag lots and tendering water rights. Plaintiffs further 
claim that the City breached Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-704(l)(a) by not allowing certain grievances to 
be presented to the board of adjustments. 
1fl9 Finally, plaintiffs contend that the City's decision to approve the P.U.D. was arbitrary and 
capricious because (1) it was illegal, on the grounds set forth above, and (2) it was not supported by 
substantial evidence because some of the required documents, which plaintiffs claim were mandatory 
for the decision making process, were not before the city council or planning commission when they 
made their respective decisions. 
f20 The City responds that its approval of the P.U.D. was not arbitrary, capricious, or illegal 
because it substantially complied with its ordinances in approving the P.U.D. According to the City, 
strict compliance with the ordinances was not necessary because the ordinances are procedural in 
nature and because less than complete compliance with such ordinances did not prejudice plaintiffs. 
The City emphasizes that the approval process for the P.U.D. spanned more than a year, during which 
time Peay attended seven planning commission meetings and six city council meetings wherein 
various concerns were discussed, by both city officials and plaintiffs, and numerous conditions 
imposed. The City stresses that all of the requirements complained about by plaintiffs were 
eventually met or substantially satisfied. 
«|21 The issue before us, therefore, is whether the City's approval of the P.U.D. was arbitrary, 
capricious, or illegal.^ 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
|22 Summary judgment is appropriate only when there are no genuine issues of fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). In reviewing a 
grant of summary judgment, we do not defer to the legal conclusions of the district court, but review 
them for correctness. When reviewing a municipality's land use decision, our review is limited to 
determining "whether . . . the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal." Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-
1001(3)(b)(1996). 
ANALYSIS 
[^23 A municipality's land use decisions are entitled to a great deal of deference. See Xanthos v. 
Board of Adjustment 685 P.2d 1032, 1034 (Utah 1984); Triangle Oil Inc. v. North Salt Lake Corp., 
609 P.2d 1338,1339-40 (Utah 1980); Cottonwood Heights Citizen Ass'n v. Board of Comm'rs, 593 
P.2d 138,140 (Utah 1979); Navlor v. Salt Lake City Corp., 410 P.2d 764 (Utah 1965). Therefore, 
"the courts generally will not so interfere with the actions of a city council unless its action is outside 
of its authority or is so wholly discordant to reason and justice that its action must be deemed 
capricious and arbitrary and thus in violation of the complainant's rights." Triangle Oil 609 P.2d at 
1340. Indeed, the statute that forms the basis of this appeal requires the courts to "presume that land 
use decisions and regulations are valid." Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(3)(a). However, this discretion 
is not completely unfettered, and the presumption is not absolute. If a municipality's land use decision 
is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal, it will not be upheld. See id. § 10-9-100l(3)(b). 
f24 In the present case, plaintiffs argue that the City's decision to approve the P.U.D. was arbitrary 
and capricious. A municipality's land use decision is arbitrary and capricious if it is not supported by 
substantial evidence. See Patterson v. Utah County Bd. of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602, 604 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995). In evaluating the City's decision under this standard, we review the evidence in the 
record to ensure that the City proceeded within the limits of fairness and acted in good faith. See icl 
We also determine whether, in light of the evidence before the City, a reasonable mind could reach 
the same conclusion as the City. See kL; see also 2 Young, Anderson's American Law of Zoning § 
11.11, at 461 (4th ed. 1996) (noting that when reviewing an ordinance that approves a P.U.D., courts 
determine whether there is support for the approval and whether the decision was reasonable). We do 
not, however, weigh the evidence anew or substitute our judgment for that of the municipality. See 
Patterson. 893 P.2d at 604; see also Xanthos, 685 P.2d at 1035. 
|25 In the case at bar, the undisputed facts demonstrate that the City's decision was not arbitrary or 
capricious but was the result of careful consideration and was supported by substantial evidence. Of 
significant import, consideration of the P.U.D. spanned nearly a year and a half and involved more 
than a dozen separate meetings wherein public input was heard, objections voiced, and modifications 
to the P.U.D. imposed. Although certain materials were not timely submitted, the majority of the 
required documentation was before the planning commission and the city council when the P.U.D. 
ultimately was approved. That documentation, as well as the other evidence before the commission 
and the council, supported approval of the P.U.D. Moreover, throughout the approval process and in 
an effort to meet the P.U.D. requirements, the city council required Peay to satisfy numerous 
conditions concerning the proposed development, all of which Peay eventually fulfilled. In short, the 
undisputed evidence reveals without question that substantial evidence supported the City's decision 
and that a reasonable person could have reached the same decision as the City. We conclude, 
therefore, that the City's decision to approve the P.U.D. was not arbitrary or capricious. 
%26 This conclusion does not end our inquiry, however. Under Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 (3)(b), 
we must also determine whether the City's decision was illegal. Plaintiffs argue convincingly that the 
City's decision to approve the P.U.D. was illegal because the City violated its own ordinances during 
the approval process. Plaintiffs highlight that compliance with the city ordinances at issue was, under 
the City's own legislatively enacted standard, mandatory. Plaintiffs point to Springville City 
ordinance 11-10-101, which states, "For purposes of this Title, certain words and terms are defined as 
follows:... (4) Words 'shall' and 'must' are always mandatory." (Emphasis added.) 
[^27 Title 11 of the Springville ordinances, entitled "Development Code," details the procedures and 
requirements for P.U.D. approval, including those that plaintiffs contend the City violated. Those 
procedures and requirements, as indicated in the ordinances quoted above, frequently are prefaced by 
the words "shall" and "must." Thus, according to the City's own rule of interpretation, compliance 
with the P.U.D. procedures and requirements containing these words was mandatory. 
f28 In its ruling granting summary judgment in favor of the City, the district court appeared to 
recognize the mandatory nature of the city ordinances but concluded nonetheless that substantial 
compliance with those ordinances was sufficient. In fact, one of the express legal principles upon 
which the district court premised its ruling was that "[t]he city's actions approving the PUD must be 
upheld if those actions are in substantial compliance with the city's ordinances." 
1f29 The district court's use of the substantial compliance doctrine in the face of ordinances that are 
expressly mandatory was erroneous. While substantial compliance with matters in which a 
municipality has discretion may indeed suffice, it does not when the municipality itself has 
legislatively removed any such discretion. The fundamental consideration in interpreting legislation, 
whether at the state or local level, is legislative intent. See Board of Educ. v. Salt Lake County, 659 
P.2d 1030,1030 (Utah 1983). Application of the substantial compliance doctrine where the 
ordinances at issue are explicitly mandatory contravenes the unmistakable intent of those ordinances. 
f 30 Municipal zoning authorities are bound by the terms and standards of applicable zoning 
ordinances and are not at liberty to make land use decisions in derogation thereof. See Thurston v. 
Cache County, 626 P.2d 440,444-45 (Utah 1981). The irony of the City's position on appeal is 
readily apparent: the City contends that it need only "substantially comply" with ordinances it has 
legislatively deemed to be mandatory. Stated simply, the City cannot "change the rules halfway 
through the game." Brendle v. City of Draper, 937 P.2d 1044, 1048 (Utah Ct. App, 1997). The City 
was not entitled to disregard its mandatory ordinances. Because the City did not properly comply 
with the ordinances governing P.U.D. approval, we conclude that under Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 
(3)(b), the City's decision approving the P.U.D. was illegal. 
f31 The City's failure to pass the legality requirement of section 10-9-100 l(3)(b), however, does 
not automatically entitle plaintiffs to the relief they request. Rather, plaintiffs must establish that they 
were prejudiced by the City's noncompliance with its ordinances or, in other words, how, if at all, the 
City's decision would have been different and what relief, if any, they are entitled to as a result. See, 
e.g.. Board of Ed. v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030, 1035 (Utah 1983) (noting that recovery for 
failure of county to follow mandatory statutory requirements required showing of prejudice from 
such failure); see also Anderson's American Law of Zoning § 11.24 (explaining that party 
challenging approval of P.U.D. must show "actual injury"). 
f32 With respect to the City's alleged violations of state statutory requirements, namely, Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 10-9-204,10-9-703, 10-9-704(l)(a), 10-9-707(2)(a), and 10-9-811(1 )(b), as outlined herein, 
it appears that the district court summarily dismissed these claims without analysis. With the 
exception of the alleged violation of section 10-9-703, the district court articulated no basis for 
rejecting these claims, thus preventing us from reviewing the correctness of those rulings. As to 
section 10-9-703, the district court simply concluded that plaintiffs could not appeal the overall 
approval of the P.U.D. to the board of adjustments; this, however, overlooked the nature of plaintiffs' 
claims under that section, namely, that certain City actions apart from the final P.U.D. approval were 
appealable to the board of adjustments, i.e., the City's issuance of building permit 03675 and the 
recording of Plat 4. Thus, whether section 10-9-703 was violated, as well as the other enumerated 
sections, must be addressed as part of the proceedings on remand. 
CONCLUSION 
f 33 The district court's grant of summary judgment is therefore reversed, and this matter is 
remanded for further proceedings. 
T[34 Chief Justice Howe, Associate Chief Justice Durham, Justice Stewart, and Justice Zimmerman 
concur in Justice Russon's opinion. 
1. We note our disapproval of plaintiffs' methods of circumventing the fifty-page limit for appellate 
briefs, see Utah R. App. P. 24(f). Plaintiffs' brief contains numerous, lengthy footnotes that set forth 
key arguments (the opening brief contains 104 footnotes, some of which consume up to three- fourths 
of a page). Also, plaintiffs' discussion of central points is cursory and incomplete, and many of their 
citations to the record are simply references to arguments made to the district court. 
2. Plaintiffs also raise a panoply of constitutional issues. We do not address these issues because 
plaintiffs have failed to brief them adequately. See Utah R. App. P. 24(i) ("All briefs under this rule 
must be concise, presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free from 
burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial and scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in compliance may 
be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court....") and Utah R. App. P. 24 (a)(9) 
("The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues 
presented . . . with citations to the authorities . . . relied on."). Plaintiffs' brief on these issues is poorly 
organized, confusing, and difficult to follow. It is frequently difficult to determine exactly what 
assertions are being made and the substance of the accompanying arguments. We can certainly 
comprehend the district court's observation that "plaintiffs spent considerable effort wandering in 
fields of irrelevancy." Furthermore, many of plaintiffs' constitutional arguments are premised on the 
existence of constitutional liberty and property interests which plaintiffs fail to define and which are 
not supported by any authority. Their bald assertion that the interests are "self-evident" is insufficient, 
See also State v. Carver, 776 P.2d 886, 888 (Utah 1989) ("[T]his Court need not analyze and address 
in writing each and every argument, issue, or claim raised.... Rather, it is a maxim of appellate 
review that the nature and extent of an opinion rendered by an appellate court is largely discretionary 
with that court."). 
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GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge: 
1J1 Payson City appeals the trial court's reversal of the City Council's decision denying plaintiffs' request to 
change the zoning of their property. The trial court determined the City Council's decision was arbitrary and 
capricious because it was not supported by any evidence other than public opinion. We reverse. 
BACKGROUND 
1J2 This appeal involves property in Payson City, Utah, zoned for the most part R-1-A, which is a low density 
residential agricultural zoning with minimum lot size of one acre. The property is located west of Interstate 
Highway 15 and is abutted on four sides by property zoned for industrial use. The General Plan for Payson City 
identifies mostly residential land use east of 1-15 and industrial and agricultural property west of 1-15. Plaintiffs, 
however, note that some of the property west of 1-15 is now zoned for residential housing and that the Payson 
Planning Zone Map anticipates large areas zoned for residential use west of 1-15. Furthermore, the General 
Plan encourages a mixture of residential densities, including low, medium, and high density housing.^ 
P In January 1999, David S. White, on behalf of several landowners, applied to Payson City to have property 
changed from R-1-A to R-2-75, high density multifamily residential zoning (the White application). The Planning 
Commission held a public hearing on March 20,1996 to receive public comment on the proposal. Prior to the 
public hearing, thirty-eight property owners in the area of the proposed change presented the Planning 
Commission a signed petition opposing the change. During the hearing, the Commission heard public 
comment both for and against the zoning change. Specifically, thirteen individuals spoke in opposition to the 
White application while five spoke in favor of the change-four of these proponents had an interest in the 
subject property. Public opposition included concerns over maintaining the agricultural nature of the area, 
including using the land for large animals, and also concerns over infrastructure. The Planning Commission 
ultimately recommended that the City Council deny the White application. 
TJ4 Following the Planning Commission meeting on March 20, the City Council met and heard public comment. 
During this public hearing, the Council heard concerns similar to those raised before the Planning Commission, 
and also heard concerns about traffic in the area if the zoning change was approved. Advocates of the 
application expressed the need the area had for low income housing. Based upon the General Plan, traffic 
concerns, and the Planning Commission's recommendation, the City Council voted to deny the White 
application. 
1f5 In addition to the White application, another property owner, Louis Peterson, a plaintiff in this action, filed a 
zoning change application on March 8,1996, requesting that his and other's property be changed from R-1-A 
to R-1-9, medium density residential (the Peterson application). The Peterson application stated that the one 
acre minimum lot size was too large for the owner's needs. 
Tf6 A public hearing on the Peterson application was held on May 22, 1996. During this hearing, some of the 
neighboring businesses expressed concern that the existing industrial use of neighboring property would be 
incompatible with a change to higher density residential zoning. Specifically, Associated Foods, which runs a 
warehouse in the area, feared that new residents would seek action to prevent its trucks from operating twenty-
four hours a day. Another business expressed concerns that residents would object to the noise and smell 
from its packing facility. Subsequently, the City Council denied the Peterson application. 
Tf7 Plaintiffs commenced this action in district court on April 7, 1997, claiming that Payson City had wrongfully 
denied their rezoning requests. During a hearing on the parties' cross motions for summary judgment, the trial 
court expressed concern that the record did not contain any basis for the City Council's decision to deny the 
applications. The trial court requested that Payson City prepare findings setting forth the reasons for its denial. 
The City prepared written findings which detailed the public comment received during the public hearings. The 
trial court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order reversing the City Council's decision, determining that 
the Council had acted arbitrarily and capriciously because its decision had no evidentiary support other than 
public opposition. Payson City appeals. 
MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION AND APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
1f8 As a preliminary matter, we address plaintiffs' motion to certify this case to the supreme court. Payson City 
initially appealed directly to the supreme court. In its docketing statement, Payson City stated that the supreme 
court had original appellate jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1999).^ By its 
own motion, the supreme court transferred the case to this court pursuant to Rule 44 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. The supreme court stated that it was transferring the case because the appeal was 
"taken from an order, judgement or decree of a court in a case that is not within the original appellate 
jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court." 
1J9 Based on the parties' comments at oral argument and our own actions in a similar case,^ apparently some 
confusion exists over which court has original appellate jurisdiction over a district court's review of a city 
council's decisions on zoning issues. As counsel for Payson City noted at oral argument, none of the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1996), the statutory description of the court of appeals' jurisdiction, 
specifically assign this court original appellate jurisdiction over cases of this nature. The supreme court, 
however, seems to have consistently determined that it does not have original appellate jurisdiction over 
zoning cases under the catch-all provision found in section 78-2-2(3)(j). Accordingly, this court must have 
jurisdiction. Examining section 78-2a-3, the only provision that could apply is subsection (2)(b)(i) which gives 
this court jurisdiction over "appeals from the district court review of adjudicative proceedings of agencies of 
political subdivisions of the state or other local agencies " Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(b)(i) (1996). As 
Payson City's counsel noted, however, this case does not arise from an "adjudicative" proceeding, but rather a 
legislative proceeding. Nevertheless, in order to effectuate the supreme court's order transferring these 
appeals to this court, "adjudicative" must be read broadly to include both administrative and legislative 
proceedings of state political subdivisions and local governments. Thus, read in conjunction with section 78-2-
2, governing the supreme court's jurisdiction, section 78-2a-3(2)(b)(i) confers original appellate jurisdiction to 
this court over this matter. 
1J10 This case was not transferred to us pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1996), sometimes referred to 
colloquially as a "pour over," but rather was an administrative transfer pursuant to Rule 44 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, which requires that a timely appeal "pursued in an appellate court that does not have 
jurisdiction in the case" be transferred to the proper appellate court. In this case, however, we decline to 
recommend certification. See Utah R. App. P. 43 (requiring an "affirmative vote of four judges of the court"). 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1f11 The initial issue we must determine is the proper standard of review for both the trial court and this court. 
Applying that standard of review, we must next determine whether the trial court erred in reversing the City 
Council's decision. These issues present questions of law, which we review for correctness. See State v. Pena. 
869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
ANALYSIS 
A. Proper Standard of Review 
1J12 In this case, the parties vigorously dispute the proper standard of review. Neither party, however, disputes 
that two recent cases govern the issue. Additionally, neither party disputes that the Payson City Council's 
decision was legislative rather than administrative. 
1f13 In Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City of Springville. 1999 UT 25, 979 P.2d 332, the 
supreme court reviewed a city's approval of a Planned Unit Development (PUD). In that case, the court applied 
the substantial evidence standard to the city's decision. See id. at 1(24. The court determined that the city had 
acted illegally in approving the PUD because it had failed to follow its own city ordinances. See id. at ^ [30. 
Importantly, in Springville Citizens, the court did not discuss whether it viewed the City of Springville's decision 
as administrative or legislative. Rather, the court merely stated that a municipality's land use decisions are 
traditionally afforded great deference, but are arbitrary and capricious when not supported by substantial 
evidence. See |dL at fflf23-24. 
If 14 Subsequently, this court reviewed Draper City's decision to deny a zoning change application. See 
Harmon City v. Draper City. 2000 UT App 31,lf7, 997 P.2d 321. In Harmon City, we reviewed the case law and 
the statutory history governing the arbitrary and capricious standard as it applied to land use decisions. See id. 
at U1J8-25. T h i s court concluded that the enactment in 1991 of Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(3)^ largely 
codified earlier case law and "did not alter the deferential review of a municipality's legislative zoning 
classification decisions under the arbitrary and capricious standard." \jL at If 14. 
1J15 Significantly, Harmon City interpreted Springville Citizens to still differentiate between administrative and 
legislative proceedings. See id. at 1f19. This court determined that Springville Citizens involved judicial review 
of an administrative proceeding governed by city ordinances that expressly limited the city's discretion over 
PUD approvals. See id. at ffl|21-23. In contrast, Harmon City involved a request to change the city's zoning 
which is governed only by section 10-9-1001(3). See id. at 1J21. In other words, this court distinguished 
Sprinqville Citizens because it involved an administrative proceeding which has traditionally been reviewed 
under the substantial evidence standard, whereas Harmon City addressed a legislative proceeding traditionally 
reviewed under the reasonably debatable standard. See id. at 1J25. Thus, according to Harmon City, the 
reasonably debatable standard must be applied when reviewing a municipality's legislative decisions. See id. 
Both the substantial evidence and reasonably debatable standards, however, are alternative aspects of the 
arbitrary and capricious standard of review. See id. at ffl[15, 26. Thus, a municipality's decision is always 
reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious standard; however, under that standard, an administrative 
proceeding is viewed non-deferentially under the substantial evidence standard, while a legislative proceeding 
is viewed deferentially under the reasonably debatable standard. 
1J16 Nevertheless, plaintiffs argue that Harmon City's interpretation of Springville Citizens was wrong because 
the supreme court clearly abandoned the differing standards of review for municipal land use decisions and 
adopted a "one-size-fits-all" standard, requiring review of all municipal land use decisions under the substantial 
evidence standard regardless of whether they are administrative or legislative. Thus, according to plaintiffs, we 
are required by Springville Citizens to apply the substantial evidence standard. We disagree. 
1J17 As we noted, this court has interpreted the supreme court's opinion in Springville Citizens to still require 
that legislative land use decisions of municipalities be reviewed under the reasonably debatable standard. See 
jdL Once a panel of this court has decided an issue of law, subsequent panels are bound by the earlier panel's 
decision. See State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 n.3 (Utah 1994) (stating horizontal stare decisis requires 
adherence to decisions of prior panels in most instances);^ State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256,1269 (Utah 
1993) (holding "stare decisis has equal application when one panel of a multi-panel appellate court is faced 
with a prior decision of a different panel"). Thus, despite plaintiffs' urging that we abandon the rule pronounced 
in Harmon City and follow what they view is the clear holding of Springville Citizens, "'we are not at liberty to 
overrule our prior holding."' State v. Ostler. 2000 UT App 28,f7, 996 P.2d 1065, (citation omitted), cert, 
granted. 9 P.3d 170 (Utah 2000).® Because there is no dispute that the Payson City Council's decision was 
legislative, we apply the reasonably debatable standard as mandated by Harmon City. 
B. Application of the Reasonably Debatable Standard 
Tf18 Although the parties do not dispute what standard the trial court applied, the trial court's Memorandum 
Decision does not state that it applied the substantial evidence standard. The trial court reversed the City 
Council's decision because, although the reasons may have been legally sufficient, they were not supported by 
any factual basis. The trial court relied on Davis County v. Clearfield City. 756 P.2d 704 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) to 
support its decision. The Davis County opinion, however, addresses the denial of a conditional use permit, 
which is an administrative proceeding reviewed under the substantial evidence standard. See id. at 711. in 
Davis County, we held that under the substantial evidence standard, public opinion cannot be the sole basis for 
denying a conditional use permit. See id. Thus, it appears the trial court erred by applying the substantial 
evidence standard applicable to administrative proceedings, rather than the reasonably debatable standard 
applicable to legislative decisions. Nevertheless, we could affirm the trial court's ruling if we determined that 
under the more deferential standard applicable to this case, the city's decision was not reasonably debatable 
and therefore was arbitrary and capricious, or that the city's decision was illegal because it was either 
procedurally flawed or inconsistent with a statute. See State v. Jarman. 1999 UT App 269,1(5 n.2, 987 P.2d 
1284 (holding we may affirm trial court's ruling on any alternative ground even though that ground or theory 
was not identified by lower court as basis for its ruling). 
If 19 Although the trial court ordered Payson City to prepare written findings to support its decision, the record 
reflects that the trial court did not receive any additional evidence not adduced before the City Council. At oral 
argument, plaintiffs argued that our review is limited to only the evidence submitted in reference to the White 
application because the trial court's decision only referenced the White application. The initial appeal to the 
district court, however, was on behalf of both the White and Peterson applications. When a lower court reviews 
a municipality's land use decision and takes no additional evidence, "we review the [municipal land use 
decision] just as if the appeal had come directly from the [municipality]." Davis County. 756 P.2d at 710. In 
other words, we review the trial court's decision de novo, and we are free to consider all the evidence 
contained in the record. See id. Furthermore, the trial court ordered Payson City to prepare written findings 
from its public hearings. The evidence which plaintiffs claim is not properly before us is referred to in the 
findings prepared by Payson City at the trial court's request.^ Because the trial court relied on these findings 
to make its decision, we may also review these findings to determine whether the city council acted arbitrarily 
or capriciously. 
1J20 Turning to the merits of this appeal, we must review the Payson City Council's decision under the 
deferential reasonably debatable standard of review. See Harmon City, 2000 UT App 31 at 1J25. As noted, this 
standard is highly deferential to the municipality's decision: "If the [zoning] ordinance and the stated policies 
and reasons underlying it do, within reason, debatably promote the legitimate goals of increased public health, 
safety, or general welfare, we must allow [the city's] legislative judgment to control." Smith Inv. Co. v. Sandy 
City. 958 P.2d 245, 253 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (footnote omitted). Traditionally, courts have granted this high 
degree of deference due to the political nature of zoning decisions. Unlike administrative proceedings which 
turn almost exclusively on the evidence presented, zoning decisions require municipalities to weigh competing 
interests and conflicting concerns to arrive at a decision that serves the general welfare of its residents. See. 
e.g., Harmon City, 2000 UT App 31 at fl18 (stating "zoning classifications reflectQ a legislative policy decision 
with which courts will not interfere except in the most extreme cases"). Thus, in order to prevail, plaintiffs have 
the burden of showing that Payson City's decision to continue to use "the property for [low density residential 
and agricultural] purposes could not promote the general welfare." \± at TJ28; see also Smith Inv. Co.. 958 P.2d 
at 252 (holding court will uphold zoning ordinance decision "'if it is reasonably debatable that it is in the interest 
of the general welfare.'" (citation omitted)). 
T[21 The Payson City Council stated three reasons for denying the zoning change applications: (1) the zone 
change would be contrary to the General Plan, (2) the zone change could create traffic problems relating to the 
existing industrial park, and (3) the Planning Commission recommended the applications be denied. In 
reversing the City Council's decision, the trial court determined that, although legally sufficient, these reasons 
were not supported by any factual basis. 
TJ22 The trial court relied on Davis County in making its ruling and stated that public opposition alone cannot be 
the sole basis for denying the zoning change. See Davis County. 756 P.2d at 711. Although public opposition 
cannot be the sole basis for making a land use decision in an administrative proceeding. See id., this case 
involves a legislative proceeding. As we stated in Harmon City, "a city may rely on the concerns of interested 
citizens when performing legislative functions." Harmon City, 2000 UT App 31 at fl26. Furthermore, we stated 
that "the public clamor doctrine has no application when a legislative body acts in a legislative capacity." Jd at 
1127. 
1J23 In this case, the record reveals that virtually all the material presented to the Planning Commission and to 
the City Council consisted of public comment both for and against the zoning change and presentation of the 
General Plan and the Planning Zoning Map. Our review of the record in this case indicates that the City 
Council properly considered the public comment and came to a reasonable decision based on the information 
before it. Specifically, two businesses in the area expressed concern over the compatibility of higher density 
residential areas with their businesses and the neighboring industrial zones. One of the businesses submitted 
a letter detailing why it located in the area. This business stated it was attracted to the area because the 
"master plan . . . was far sighted enough to separate the industrial area from the residential area by a natural 
break." The business stated that it operates twenty-four hours a day with "bright dock lights, and large trucks .. 
. [a]ll of which would be a concern for the future residential area that is proposed." Another businessman in the 
area testified that because his business was contiguous to the proposed zone change he felt he would be out 
of business within a year because neighboring residents would not tolerate the noise and smell from his fruit 
processing plant. 
1J24 As we have previously discussed, "a basic purpose of traditional zoning is '"to minimize conflicts between 
incompatible uses.'"" Smith Inv. Co.. 958 P.2d at 254 n.13 (citation omitted). The potential incompatibility of 
industrial and residential land uses hardly needs comment. Nevertheless, we explained: 
"The exclusion of places of business from residential districts is not a declaration that such places 
are nuisances or that they are to be suppressed as such, but it is a part of the general plan by 
which the city's territory is allotted to different uses, in order to prevent, or at least to reduce, the 
congestion, disorder, and dangers which often inhere in unregulated municipal development." 
i i at 254 (quoting Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 391-93, 47 S. Ct. 114, 119-20 (1926)). 
1f25 Faced with the concerns raised by businesses in the area, the City Council's action was at least 
reasonably debatable. A city acts well within its mandate when it creates specific areas of industrial and 
residential zones to prevent incompatible uses from neighboring one another. Plaintiffs did not produce any 
testimony or other evidence to contradict the public concern that proposed residential zones would conflict with 
the existing industrial zones. 
1J26 Additionally, several residents of the area testified that they opposed the change because they wanted to 
preserve the area for agricultural uses and to raise large animals. These opponents sought to preserve the 
open agricultural character of the area. Like the businesses that moved to the area in order to operate without 
conflicting with neighbors, several residents located there in order to keep horses and other large animals 
which are not necessarily compatible with medium to high density residential uses. A city can deny a zoning 
change request if the "'legislative body has a reasonable basis to believe that it will conserve the values of 
other properties and encourage the most appropriate use thereof '" Idu at 255 (citation omitted). In this 
case, several residents testified about the value of the land as low density agricultural land, and the City could 
properly seek to preserve the area for such use. 
1J27 On the other hand, the City Council also heard from residents who supported the change. Several spoke 
about the benefits of having more affordable higher density housing in the area. Also, one expert in city 
planning testified on behalf of the zoning change. Jim Wilbert, who has twenty years of experience in city 
planning, testified that he had reviewed the proposal and believed it would create affordable housing near the 
industrial park. Assuming a need for affordable housing exists, this testimony does not necessarily refute the 
concerns raised by those opposed to the change, nor the City's ultimate decision to deny plaintiffs' rezoning 
request. Specifically, plaintiffs' expert did not show how the higher density residential areas would be 
compatible with the neighboring industrial uses, nor that the low density agricultural zoning is contrary to the 
general welfare.® 
CONCLUSION 
1J28 Under section 78-2a-3(2)(b)(i), we have original appellate jurisdiction over appeals from a district court's 
review of a municipality's land use decisions. Because the denial of plaintiffs' request to rezone property is a 
legislative act, the proper standard of review is the reasonably debatable standard as stated in Harmon City. In 
reversing Payson City's decision to deny plaintiffs' rezoning request, the trial court incorrectly applied the 
substantial evidence standard. Applying the proper standard to this case, Payson City's denial of plaintiffs' 
request was reasonably debatable and not arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. 
1f29 Therefore, we reverse the trial court's decision. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Presiding Judge 
H30 I CONCUR: 
William A. Thome, Jr., Judge 
JACKSON, Judge (dissenting): 
1f31 I write separately to express disagreement with the analysis contained in the main opinion. First, I believe 
this case should be certified to the supreme court. Second, I disagree with the standard of review applied in the 
opinion and its reliance on horizontal stare decisis. 
Certification 
1f32 The Bradleys filed a Rule 43 Suggestion for Certification with this court.*8* See Utah R. App. P. 43. As 
discussed further below, in Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City of Springville (Springville). 1999 
UT 25, 979 P.2d 332, the Utah Supreme Court unanimously applied a substantial evidence standard of review 
to a municipality's legislative decision to deny a rezoning application. On the other hand, in Harmon City, Inc. v. 
Draper City (Harmon). 2000 UT App 31, 997 P.2d 321, two judges of this court applied a reasonably debatable 
standard of review. The Bradleys' suggestion for certification proposed that the existence of this conflict 
satisfied both prongs of Rule 43, which authorizes us to certify two types of cases to the supreme court: 
(1) Cases which are of such a nature that it is apparent that the case should be decided by the 
Supreme Court and that the Supreme Court would probably grant a petition for a writ of certiorari 
in the case if decided by the Court of Appeals, irrespective of how the Court of Appeals might 
rule, and 
(2) Cases which will govern a number of other cases involving the same legal issue or issues 
pending in the district courts . . . or the Court of Appeals . . . . 
Utah R. App. P. 43(c). 
1J33 Payson City did not file a response to the Bradleys' Suggestion for Certification. At oral argument, counsel 
for Payson City was asked to respond to the certification issue. He stated that Payson City initiated the appeal 
in the supreme court because it believed that court had original jurisdiction. Thus, he contended that when the 
supreme court sent the case to this court, it was a "pourover" and not a "transfer." Rule 43(a) prohibits the 
court of appeals from certifying back to the supreme court a case which has been poured over from the 
supreme court's original jurisdiction. However, as the majority opinion points out, the supreme court order 
clearly "transferred" the case to this court based on our original jurisdiction over the case. Accordingly, Payson 
City's opposition to certification based on jurisdictional grounds fails. 
1J34 When pressed further at oral argument, counsel acknowledged that, aside from the jurisdictional question, 
this case satisfied both criteria for certification set out by rule 43(c). He also agreed that a ruling from the 
supreme court would be helpful to the courts, counsel, local governments, and private parties. Either criterion 
provides a sound basis for certification under rule 43. 
P 5 The majority opinion has given short shrift to the certification issue, stating simply that "we decline to 
recommend certification," without addressing Rule 43 or analyzing the merits of certification. I agree with 
counsel that the suggestion for certification fully satisfies the requirements of Rule 43. 
1J36 First, this case is one that is "of such a nature that it is apparent that the Supreme Court would probably 
grant a petition for a writ of certiorari in the case if decided by [this court], irrespective of how [this court] might 
rule " Utah R. App. P. 43(c)(1). The issue in this case is the standard of review under which a 
municipality's legislative decision to deny a rezoning application should be reviewed pursuant to a statute 
originally passed in 1991. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(3) (1999) (stating municipality's land use decision 
"shall" be reviewed only to "determine . . . whether or not the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal"). 
1f37 In Harmon, we addressed this exact issue. In that case, the majority opinion interpreted "arbitrary, 
capricious, or illegal," for purposes of legislative decisions, to mean the reasonably debatable standard of 
review, which is very deferential. Harmon. 2000 UT App 31 at fflJ14-17. Harmon retained the same case law 
standard of review for legislative decisions that was applied before 1991.1 dissented, arguing that the recent 
supreme court case, Springville. bound us to apply the less deferential substantial evidence standard of review. 
The appellant in Harmon did not file a petition for certiorari. Thus, the main issue before us escaped supreme 
court review in that case. 
1J38 In light of the clear conflict between Springville and Harmon, it is highly likely that the supreme court would 
grant a writ of certiorari in this case, no matter how we rule. See Utah R. App. P. 43(c)(1). Indeed, the majority 
opinion recognizes this conflict between Springville and Harmon. However, its sole reason for not applying the 
Springville standard is unwarranted devotion to the idea of horizontal stare decisis. As I discuss further below, I 
believe vertical stare decisis, i.e. our duty to obey the supreme court, trumps our duty to obey the holding of a 
coequal panel of this court. 
1f39 Second, both parties to this case agree the resolution of this case "will govern a number of other cases 
involving the same legal issue or issues pending in the . . . courts." Utah R. App. P. 43(c)(2). Thus, the issue 
merits a definitive statement by the supreme court. 
1J40 In sum, this case is a prime candidate for certification under Rule 43. Both parties agree that it is fit for 
certification and that a ruling from the supreme court is needed. 
Vertical Stare Decisis 
Tf41 At the outset, I want to emphasize that I am not attempting to bring this case within either of the State v. 
Menzies. 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994), exceptions to our horizontal stare decisis r u l e . ^ Instead, I assert this 
case is outside the mandates of horizontal stare decisis because it is within the mandates of vertical stare 
decisis. The issue is: which line of authority is superior? 
1J42 In Springville. the supreme court decided this exact issue. Springville is the controlling law. The court of 
appeals is not empowered to adopt a ruling to the contrary. Our duty to obey holdings of the supreme court is 
without exception. See Menzies. 889 P.2d at 399 n.3 (stating this court must "follow strictly the decisions 
rendered by [the supreme] court" (emphasis added)); Beltran v. Allan. 926 P.2d 892, 898 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) 
("This court is bound to follow controlling decisions of the Utah Supreme Court."). 
^43 In Harmon. I expressed the reasons why Springville should be followed. My reasoning in Harmon applies 
equally to the case before us. First, the Utah Legislature adopted a statue setting forth "a one-size-fits-all 
standard of review for 'municipalO land use decisions."' Harmon. 2000 UT App 31 at ^44 (Jackson, J., 
dissenting). The statute contains an explicit, mandatory command to the courts: "The courts shal l : . . . 
determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal." Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(3) 
(b) (1999) (emphasis added). In Springville "[t]he supreme court took this broad language at face value," 
ultimately "making the sweeping statement that '[a] municipality's land use decision is arbitrary and capricious if 
it is not supported by substantial evidence.'" Harmon. 2000 UT App 31 at TJ45 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Springville. 1999 UT 25 at 1J24). Moreover, the supreme court actually applied the substantial evidence 
standard of review in its analysis. See Springville. 1999 UT 25 at 1J25 (stating municipality's "decision was not 
arbitrary or capricious bu t . . . was supported by substantial evidence"). Our supreme court did not attempt to 
repeal the Legislature's standard of review mandate as the majority has done. Rather, the supreme court 
followed the Legislature's statutory scheme. Thus, "[t]his court is bound to follow [Springville. the] controlling 
decisionQ of the Utah Supreme Court," Beltran. 926 P.2d at 898, and the statutory command of the Legislature. 
£111 
1(44 On the other hand, the majority here relies on the erroneous distinction made by the majority in Harmon 
between a municipality's legislative and administrative land use decisions. This reliance on Harmon remains 
erroneous because vertical stare decisis commands that we follow the supreme court's clear statement in 
Springville of the proper standard of review. The Harmon distinction between legislative and administrative land 
use decisions was not made in Springville. The Harmon majority acknowledged this fact, noting that the 
supreme court did not say it was abandoning the distinction. See Harmon. 2000 UT App 31 at fl19. Thus, the 
Harmon majority interpreted the supreme court's silence in Springville as a command to preserve the 
distinction between legislative and administrative land use decisions. This approach is in error. Cf, Black's Law 
Dictionary 1414 (7th ed. 1999) (defining stare decisis with "'Lord Halsbury's assertion that a case is only 
authority for what it actually decides."' (citation omitted)). 
Tf45 Further, the majority opinion also tries to diminish the supreme court's clear statement in Springville of the 
proper standard of review. The opinion asserts that in Springville the supreme court "merely stated that a 
municipal's land use decisions . . . are arbitrary and capricious when not supported by substantial 
evidence." (Emphasis added.) However, the supreme court's statement was not merely a tangential reference 
to policy considerations, but rather was "the supreme court's 'clearQ command'" that the substantial evidence 
standard of review should apply to all municipal land use decisions. Harmon, 2000 UT App 31 at fl40 (Jackson, 
J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
TJ46 In sum, any duty horizontal stare decisis imposes on us to follow Harmon is trumped by our duty to obey 
the supreme court's clear command in Springville. Moreover, our courts traditionally give great deference to 
mandatory standards of review established by the Legislature. Accordingly, we should apply the substantial 
evidence standard of review to this case. 
CONCLUSION 
1J47 I believe we should have certified this case to the supreme court to consider the significant issue of which 
standard of review to apply to municipal land use decisions. Further, I would hold that the arbitrary and 
capricious standard of section 10-9-1001 (3)(b) requires us to apply a substantial evidence standard of review. 
Thus, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. 
Norman H. Jackson, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
1. At oral argument, the parties disputed whether the General Plan had been properly adopted. Plaintiffs 
argued the plan had never been properly adopted by Payson City. The record, however, does not show that 
plaintiffs ever objected to the General Plan prior to appeal, and, in fact, they cite to the General Plan in their 
brief to support their argument that a mixture of residential densities is encouraged. Whether or not the General 
Plan was properly adopted does not affect our disposition of this case. 
2. Section 78-2-2(3)(j) provides: "The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of 
Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction " Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) (1996). 
3. In Splendor Valley v. Summit County. Case No. 20000277-CA, a case currently pending before us, 
appellants initially filed their appeal in our court, and we transferred the appeal to the supreme court, believing 
the supreme court had original appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1996). The 
supreme court, however, transferred the case back to us stating it lacked original appellate jurisdiction, but did 
not refer in the order to a particular statutory provision that conferred this court with original appellate 
jurisdiction over the case. 
4. This statute governs appeals of municipal land use decisions to the district courts. See Utah Code Ann. § 
10-9-1001 (1999). 
5. We recognize that the supreme court has noted that "a panel may overrule its own or another panel's 
decision where 'the decision is clearly erroneous or conditions have changed so as to render the prior decision 
inapplicable.'" State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 n.3 (Utah 1994) (citation omitted). However, neither of 
these exceptions applies in this case because Harmon City is not clearly erroneous and circumstances have 
not changed since it was issued. 
6. Contrary to the dissent's assertion, we do not believe that we are disregarding the supreme court's 
controlling authority in favor of relying on horizontal stare decisis. As we stated in discussing which standard of 
review should be applied in this case, Harmon City interpreted the supreme court's decision in Springville 
Citizens to still allow different standards of review based on whether a municipality is acting administratively or 
legislatively. Thus, we are not ignoring vertical stare decisis in favor of horizontal stare decisis. Rather, we 
believe that Harmon City followed and interpreted the supreme court's decision in Springville Citizens and, as a 
co-equal panel, we are bound to follow Harmon City. We respect our dissenting colleague's argument that 
Harmon City wrongly interprets Springville Citizens; however, we do not believe Harmon City is clearly 
erroneous, see Menzies, 889 P.2d at 399 n.3, and therefore, we are required to apply it to this case. Whether 
Harmon City correctly interprets Springville Citizens should not be confused with the mandates of horizontal 
and vertical stare decisis. 
7. At oral argument, plaintiffs' counsel argued that a letter from Associated Foods was not part of record on this 
appeal because it only pertained to the Peterson application which the trial court did not address. The letter, 
however, is referred to in the factual findings prepared by Payson City and relied on by the trial court. 
8. In response to our statement in Harmon City that we found no decisions reversing a municipality's land use 
decision under the reasonably debatable standard, see Harmon City. 2000 UT App 31 at 1f18, plaintiffs refer us 
to Hall v. Korth, 244 So. 2d 766 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971) and Kanfer v. Montgomery County Council. 373 A.2d 
5 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977). These cases, however, are distinguishable in that in both cases the plaintiffs 
sought to have their property rezoned in conformity with the neighboring land. See Hall. 244 So. 2d at 768; 
Kanfer, 373 A.2d at 6-7. Further, these cases do not involve the situation where the municipality's decision was 
supported by public comment in a legislative proceeding. 
9. Whether a suggestion for certification is initiated by counsel, a three judge panel, or an individual judge of 
this court, the suggestion is circulated to the entire court. We will certify a case to the supreme court only if at 
least four judges of this court vote to do so. See Utah R. App. P. 43(a). 
10. The Menzies exceptions are (1) a clearly erroneous decision and (2) changed circumstances. See State v. 
Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 n. 3 (Utah 1994). I note that the general orthodox interpretation of stare decisis is 
subject to two exceptions: (1) urgent reasons and (2) exceptional cases. See Blacks Law Dictionary 1414 (7th 
Ed. 1999). 
11. The Utah Legislature frequently establishes standards of appellate review. For example, the Uniform 
Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) sets standards of review for appeals from government agencies. 
Typically, our courts have given great deference to the Legislature's explicit commands. 
Utah appellate courts have meticulously followed the substantial evidence standard of review under Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g) (1997). See Brown & Root Indus. Serv. v. Industrial Comm'n. 947 P.2d 671, 677 (Utah 
1997); Whitear v. Labor Comm'n. 973 P.2d 982, 984 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Similarly, our courts have respected 
the restraint imposed by the Legislature in section 63-46b-16(4)(h), requiring an abuse of discretion standard of 
review when the Legislature expressly or impliedly grants an agency discretion. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-
(4)(h)(i) through (iv) (1997); Steiner Corp. v. Auditing Div.. 1999 UT 53,1j14, 979 P.2d 357, 362 (Utah 1999); SF 
Phosphates Ltd. v. Auditing Div.. 972 P.2d 384, 385 (Utah 1998); Osman Home Improvement v. Industrial 
Comm'n. 958 P.2d 240, 243 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
In other statutory schemes, the Legislature has established exceptions to the standards of review dictated by 
UAPA, to which Utah appellate courts have adhered. See, e.g.. Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610(1 )(a) (2000); 
Schmidt v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 1999 UT 48,1J6, 980 P.2d 690. Accordingly, this deference is proper in the 
arena of administrative law, and even more so when we are reviewing decisions of local government. Utah 
courts should not ignore the standards of review pronounced by the Utah Legislature. 
TabC 
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BILLINGS, Judge: 
1f1 Harmon City, Inc. (Harmon) challenges the trial court's order granting summary judgment for Draper City 
(Draper). We affirm. 
112 Harmon bought 10.277 acres (the property) within the Draper city limits. Harmon purchased the property to 
build a twenty-four hour, 71,700-square-foot grocery store, a 13,300-square-foot drug store, and a 16,500-
square-foot "in-line tenant space." When Harmon bought the property, it was zoned RR-43 for 
residential/agricultural use. Although the property fell within an area designated for mixed use in Draper's 
General Plan, Harmon's project was not compatible with the RR-43 zoning classification. 
1J3 Therefore, in November, 1997, Harmon applied to Draper asking that the property be rezoned to C-2,^ 
under which the property would fall within a "neighborhood commercial district."^ Harmon supplemented its 
application with documentation by experts in land development. Harmon submitted its application to the Draper 
Planning Commission, which considered Harmon's request and ultimately recommended that the city council 
approve it. 
1J4 On February 3, 1998, the city council considered Harmon's application. The council heard comments from a 
Harmon representative, the planning commission, and interested citizens., Many of the comments were 
positive, however, some citizens expressed concern about having a large, twenty-four-hour grocery store in the 
primarily residential neighborhood because of the increased traffic and other safety concerns. After considering 
the planning commission's recommendation, as well as comments from the public, the city council voted to 
deny Harmon's requested zoning reclassification from RR-43 to C-2. 
1J5 On March 4, 1998, Harmon filed an appeal in the district court. Both sides moved for summary judgment 
based on the record created before the city council. In its decision granting summary judgment for Draper, the 
trial court, with our emphasis, stated, "So long as it is reasonably debatable that it is in the interest of the 
general welfare, this Court will uphold the city's zoning decision." The court noted that it was "satisfied that 
there is sufficient basis in the record to support Draper City Council's denial of plaintiffs application for 
rezoning. Accordingly, the court cannot find that the city council's action was arbitrary, capricious, or illegal." 
1J6 Harmon appeals, arguing that the trial court incorrectly relied on the "reasonably debatable" standard of 
review. Harmon argues that the trial court should have applied the "substantial evidence" standard, and that, 
under that standard, the court should have concluded that there was not substantial evidence to support the 
council's denial of the rezoning application. Harmon thus asks that we reverse the trial court's decision. 
ANALYSIS 
f 7 When reviewing a city council's decision not to change the zoning classification of property, we presume 
that the decision is valid and "determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal." 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(3) (1999).^ At issue is the meaning of arbitrary and capricious in the context of 
Draper's decision not to change the zoning classification of the property. This is a legal issue which we review 
for correctness. See Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City of Springville. 1999 UT 25,1f22, 979 
P.2d 332. 
I. The Arbitrary and Capricious Standard 
1f8 Judicial review of land use decisions by municipalities and counties has always been limited in this state to 
some formulation of the arbitrary, capricious, or illegal standard.^ However, the deference that we have 
historically granted to land use decisions under this standard has varied depending on whether the decision-
making body is acting in a legislative capacity or an administrative/adjudicative capacity.® 
Tf9 In addressing the issues presented here, it is important to recognize that the enactment and amendment of 
zoning ordinances is fundamentally a legislative act.^ Review of a municipality's legislative action has always 
been highly deferential in Utah. In Marshall v. Salt Lake City, for example, plaintiffs challenged a city's 
legislative enactment of a zoning ordinance dividing the city into districts and specifying permitted uses within 
districts. See 105 Utah 111, 141 P.2d 704, 705-06 (1943). The trial court granted judgment against the city, but 
the supreme court reversed, stating that it would uphold the zoning ordinance "if it could promote the general 
welfare; or even if it is reasonably debatable that it is in the interest of the general welfare." JdL at 709 
(emphasis added). 
1J10 The court enunciated a similarly deferential meaning of "arbitrary" in Dowse v. Salt Lake City Corp., 123 
Utah 107, 255 P.2d 723 (1953). In Dowse, a case factually similar to the present case, Salt Lake City had 
denied a landowner's petition to rezone his property from residential to commercial. See id. at 723. The 
landowner sued to have the city's decision reversed, but the district court dismissed the landowner's complaint. 
See id. at 723-24. The supreme court affirmed, noting that the city's denial of the rezone application was not 
arbitrary even if, as the landowner alleged, other blocks in the neighborhood were zoned commercial and the 
property was located in an area unsuitable for residential use. See id. at 724. "This is essentially a legislative 
problem, and the determination may be attacked only if there is no reasonable basis therefor.'" \_± (emphasis 
added) (quoting Phi Kappa lota Fraternity v. Salt Lake City. 116 Utah 536, 212 P.2d 177, 181 (1949) (quoting 
Wilkins v. City of San Bernardino, 175 P.2d 542, 549 (Cat. 1946))).*° 
1(11 In another case strikingly similar to the present one, a corporation sought to develop a shopping center on 
undeveloped land in Salt Lake County. See Gayland v. Salt Lake County, 11 Utah 2d 307, 358 P.2d 633, 634 
(1961). To develop the shopping center, the corporation needed to have the property's zoning classification 
changed from residential to commercial. See id. Although the county's planning commission recommended that 
the county commission (the county's legislative body) adopt the proposed zoning classification amendment, the 
county commission voted to deny the corporation's application after a public hearing. See id. at 634-35. The 
corporation sued the county in district court seeking to have the court compel the county to adopt the 
corporation's application for the zoning reclassification. See id. The trial court entered judgment for the 
corporation and ordered the county to adopt the zoning amendment. See id. at 634. 
TJ12 The supreme court reversed, reviewing the county's decision under the arbitrary and capricious standard. 
On the arbitrary and capricious standard, the Gayland court said: 
In zoning, as in any legislative action, the functioning authority has wide discretion. Its action is 
endowed with a presumption of validity: and it is the court's duty to resolve all doubts in favor 
thereof and not to interfere with the Commission's action unless it clearly appears to be beyond 
its power; or is unconstitutional for some such reason as it deprives one of property without due 
process of law, or capriciously and arbitrarily infringes upon his rights therein, or is unjustly 
discriminatory. 
Id. at 636 (citations omitted; emphasis added). 
1[13 The Gayland court applied a standard of review essentially identical to that currently provided by statute: 
"The courts shall: (a) presume that land use decisions and regulations are valid; and (b) determine only 
whether or not the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(3) (1999). 
f14 We conclude that the 1991 enactment of section 10-9-1001(3), which largely codifies the case law cited 
above, did not alter the deferential review of a municipality's legislative zoning classification decisions under 
the arbitrary and capricious standard. See, e.g.. Smith Inv. Co. v. Sandy City. 958 P.2d 245, 252 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998) ("[l]f an ordinance 'could promote the general welfare[,] or even if it is reasonably debatable that it is in 
the interest of the general welfare' we will uphold it." (citations omitted)). 
TJ15 We conclude that the Utah Legislature did not adopt a one-size-fits-all standard of review for legislative 
and administrative/adjudicative functions when it codified the "arbitrary, capricious, or illegal" language of 
section 10-9-1001. The Legislature uses "arbitrary and capricious" to define both review of adjudicative actions 
by a board of adjustments, see Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-708(2) (1999) ("[T]he plaintiff may only allege that the 
board of adjustment's decision was arbitrary, capricious, or illegal."), and review of legislative actions of a 
municipality, see id. § 10-9-1001(3). However, the Legislature has provided for judicial review under the 
substantial evidence standard only for adjudicative functions. See id. § 10-9-708(6) ("The court shall affirm the 
decision of the board of adjustment if the decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record."). These 
different standards of review, both described generally as arbitrary and capricious, exactly mirror the case law 
prior to the 1991 statutory enactment.^ 
1f16 Harmon cites a number of cases to support its argument that we should review the Draper City Council's 
legislative zoning decision under the substantial evidence standard. However, those cases are inapposite in 
that each involves a municipality acting in an administrative quasi-judicial capacity. Moreover, the bulk of those 
cases address decisions of a board of adjustment.® The distinction between quasi-judicial decisions of a 
board of adjustment as opposed to legislative municipal zoning decisions is significant: boards of adjustment 
have no legislative powers and are not permitted to have those powers. See Sandy City v. Salt Lake County. 
827 P.2d 212, 220 (Utah 1992); Salt Lake County Cottonwood Sanitation Dist. v. Sandv City. 879 P.2d 1379, 
1383 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
1f17 In light of the case law prior to the 1991 enactment of the current zoning statute, we read sections 10-9-
1001 and 10-9-708 as embracing the historical distinction between administrative and legislative functions for 
the purpose of judicial review. We therefore conclude that the district court properly applied the "reasonably 
debatable" standard of review in this case. 
If 18 We also reach this conclusion because the distinction between a municipality's legislative and 
administrative functions rests on an important principle: It is a legislative body's prerogative to determine public 
policy, a judicial body's job to interpret the policy, and an administrative body's job to enforce the policy. 
Establishing zoning classifications reflects a legislative policy decision with which courts will not interfere 
except in the most extreme cases. Indeed, we have found no Utah case, nor a case from any other jurisdiction, 
in which a zoning classification was reversed on grounds that it was arbitrary and capricious. 
1J19 The dissent suggests that, for purposes of judicial review, our supreme court abandoned the distinction 
between the legislative and administrative acts of a municipality in Springville Citizens for a Better Community 
v. City of Springville, 1999 UT 25, 979 P.2d 332. In Springville Citizens, the court stated: "A municipality's land 
use decision is arbitrary and capricious if it is not supported by substantial evidence." Jd at p 4 (citation 
omitted). We conclude that the supreme court did not intend, with that broad statement, to abandon the case 
law cited above. We are not convinced, from reviewing the facts relied on by the court in its opinion, that the 
supreme court was reviewing in Springville Citizens what it viewed as a legislative a c t . ^ 
$20 First, the plaintiffs in Springville Citizens sought judicial review of the city's decision to approve a planned 
unit development (PUD) rather than reclassification of the zoning district. See id. at ffif 2 - 1 0 . ^ Second, the 
plaintiffs in Springville Citizens argued that the PUD approval was arbitrary and capricious because the city 
failed to follow its own mandatory ordinances. See id. at 1f19. Those ordinances limited the discretion of the city 
council and planning commission by requiring them to consider evidence in particular documents when they 
made their respective decisions. See id. We can discern no claim in Springville Citizens that the city's actions 
were arbitrary and capricious with respect to statutory requirements as opposed to those imposed by 
ordinance. 
fl21 We therefore do not believe that Springville Citizens controls our decision as to whether Draper's decision 
not to rezone property was arbitrary and capricious under Utah's zoning statute. That statute places no 
requirement on a municipality to justify its zoning classifications by substantial evidence. 
1(22 We recognize that the city council's approval of the PUD in Springville Citizens culminated in "adoption of 
an ordinance amending the City's zoning map." 1999 UT 25,1J2, 979 P.2d 332. Furthermore, we recognize that 
some authorities, including those cited in the dissent, conclude that PUD approval is a legislative act. We note, 
however, that those authorities concluding that PUD approval was legislative went on to apply the highly 
deferential fairly debatable review appropriate to legislative a c t s . ^ 
TJ23 Moreover, in cases deciding whether PUD approval is legislative or administrative, the distinction is based 
upon the extent to which a municipality's PUD enabling ordinance limits the municipality's discretion over PUD 
approval .^ As noted above, the plaintiffs' claims in Springville Citizens were based on the city's ordinances 
limiting the discretion of the city council and planning commission by requiring them to consider certain 
information. See Springville Citizens. 1999 UT 25, lf19, 979 P.2d 332. Because the supreme court reviewed 
Springville's actions under the substantial evidence standard, we conclude that the supreme court found the 
city's discretion limited by its PUD enabling ordinance and therefore viewed the city's actions as administrative. 
Thus, although the city council of Springville chose to approve the PUD by an ordinance amending its zoning 
map, see id. at 1J2, we conclude that this procedure did not change an administrative act into a legislative one. 
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P 4 Finally, we note that the supreme court cited Patterson v. Utah County Board of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602, 
604 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), for the proposition that approval of the PUD had to be supported by substantial 
evidence. See Springville Citizens. 1999 UT 25, 1J24, 979 P.2d 332. Patterson involved judicial review of a 
county board of adjustment's decision, an administrative decision that, by statute, is reviewed under the 
substantial evidence standard. See Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-708(6) (1999). We do not think that the supreme 
court intended to sweep aside the long-standing distinction between a municipality's legislative and 
administrative acts by citing to a case controlled by a statute inapposite to review of legislative zoning 
decisions. 
1J25 We conclude that our supreme court did not intend to abandon the deferential "reasonably debatable" 
standard of review for a municipality's legislative action such as a zoning decision. Absent a clearer command 
from our supreme court, we decline to require Draper to justify by substantial evidence its purely legislative act 
of denying a requested change in zoning classification. In sum, we conclude that the district court was correct 
in using the "reasonably debatable" standard in reviewing the city council's refusal to rezone Harmon's 
property. 
II. Public Clamor Doctrine 
Tf26 Next, Harmon argues that its application to rezone the property was denied because the Draper City 
Council improperly relied on "public clamor." See Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 P.2d 704, 711-12 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988) (city's decision to deny a conditional use permit arbitrary and capricious where the city relied 
solely on "public clamor"). In relying on Davis County, however, Harmon incorrectly equates review of the 
administrative decision to deny a conditional use permit with review of a legislative act. Although both actions 
are reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious standard, a city may rely on the concerns of interested citizens 
when performing legislative functions. See Gayland v. Salt Lake County. 11 Utah 2d 307, 358 P.2d 633, 634 
(1961). 
1|27 In Gayland. the court discussed the information that a legislative body may consider when exercising its 
legislative authority to classify zoning districts: 
In support of its contention that the refusal to approve its application was an arbitrary deprivation 
of its property rights, plaintiff argues that the Commission [i.e., the legislative body] improperly 
heard, considered and based its determination on protests and representations voiced by people 
representing jealous business interests in the general area. We do not see any impropriety in the 
Commission receiving and taking into account any information they had to offer bearing on the 
problem under consideration. 
It is important to keep in mind that such a hearing is not of the same character as a trial, nor even 
of an administrative hearing or other legal proceeding, and is not limited by formal rules of 
procedure or evidence as they are. In pursuing its authority to zone the county the Commission is 
performing a legislative function. It has the responsibility of advising itself of all pertinent facts as 
a basis for determining what is in the public interest in that regard. For this reason it is entirely 
appropriate to hold public hearings and to allow any interested parties it desires to give 
information and to present their ideas on the matter. But this is by no means the only source from 
which the commissioners may obtain such information. From the fact that they hold such public 
offices it is to be assumed that they have wide knowledge of the various conditions and activities 
in the county bearing on the question of proper zoning, such as the location of businesses, 
schools, roads and traffic conditions, growth in population and housing, the capacity of utilities, 
the existing classification of surrounding property, and the effect that the proposed 
reclassification may have on these things and upon the general orderly development of the 
county. In performing their duty it is both their privilege and obligation to take into consideration 
their own knowledge of such matters and also to gather available pertinent information from all 
possible sources and give consideration to it in making their determination. 
kL at 635-36 (emphasis added). As Gayland points out, the public clamor doctrine has no application when a 
legislative body acts in a legislative capacity.^ We thus conclude that the Draper City Council was not 
required to disregard the concerns of its electorate-or its own concems-when performing in a legislative 
capacity. 
III. Plaintiffs Burden 
fi28 As the dissent explains, Harmon presented ample information to the city council that would have justified 
Harmon's requested change in zoning classification. However, in attacking the city's action, Harmon's burden 
was not to show that the city council had no reason to deny Harmon's application to rezone the property to 
commercial. Rather, the burden was on Harmon to show that the city's decision to preserve the status quo, i.e., 
its decision not to change the zoning classification of the property, was arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. That is, 
plaintiff had to show that the use of the property for residential purposes could not promote the general welfare. 
SeeSmith Inv. Co. v. Sandy City. 958 P.2d 245, 252 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (noting that court will uphold zoning 
classification if it "could promote the general welfare"). Although Harmon presented evidence to support the 
position that the proposed rezone was reasonable, the city council, upon the record before it, could have 
reasonably concluded that use of the property for residential purposes consistent with the current zoning status 
was entirely appropriate.^ We therefore affirm the trial court's decision to uphold this legislative act of the 
Draper City Council. 
CONCLUSION 
1f29 The trial court correctly applied the reasonably debatable standard of review to Draper's legislative 
decision not to change the zoning classification of Harmon's property. We do not doubt that the city would have 
been justified in relying on the extensive documentation that Harmon presented had it decided to rezone the 
property. However, Harmon has failed to show that the present zoning of the property for residential use could 
not promote the general welfare. We therefore affirm the district court's summary judgment in favor of Draper. 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
1J30 I CONCUR: 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
JACKSON, Judge (dissenting): 
If31 I respectfully dissent because I would reverse the trial court's order granting summary judgment for Draper 
City (Draper). 
ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND 
Tf32 When Harmon City, Inc. (Harmons) bought the property at issue, the property was zoned RR-43 for 
residential/agricultural use, but was in an area designated by Draper's General Plan for Mixed Use (Planned 
Development)^ The property was also to be part of the "700 East Area Master Plan," which had not yet been 
formulated. 
1J33 Harmons supplemented its rezoning application to Draper with the following materials: a study by a 
certified property appraiser analyzing how neighborhood shopping centers affected the value of surrounding 
residential areas, a site lighting analysis, sketches of various aspects of the development, a study by a traffic 
engineer evaluating how the development would affect traffic, several endorsement letters and surveys from 
citizens living near other Harmons stores, an analysis of estimated economic gains and tax revenues from the 
development, expert explanations of the differences between neighborhood and regional shopping centers, 
and documentation of Harmons's charitable support of neighborhood schools. 
1134 The Draper Planning Commission (the Commission) prepared a staff report dated January 2,1998. In 
recommending that the city council approve the zoning change, the report stated, "The proposed area is 
master planned as Mixed Use; therefore, the proposed Zoning is consistent with the City's General Plan." The 
report further opined that "[t]he property, with the proposed conditions of approval, will be able to accommodate 
the proposed uses, if designed appropriately." Finally, the report listed several conditions that had to be met to 
receive a conditional use permit for the site. 
1J35 At a January 8, 1998 meeting, the Commission discussed Harmons's application. A Harmons 
representative presented the material Harmons had submitted with its application, along with other information-
-e.g., regarding lighting, landscaping, and buffer zones vis-a-vis the adjacent residential neighborhood-
showing the proposed development in a positive way. Several citizens spoke for and against the project. The 
Commission postponed making a decision on the application until after another meeting two days later to 
discuss the 700 East Area Master Plan. Then, at its January 13, 1998 meeting, the Commission voted to 
recommend that the city council grant Harmons's request by adopting C-2 zoning for the property. The 
Commission stated the vote was supported by "[t]he reasons listed in the Staff Report dated January 2,1998, 
which include C-2 zoning is in agreement with the City Master Plan for this area, as well as the 700 East 
Master Plan." 
1J36 The Commission then prepared a Staff Report for the City Council, recommending the zoning change and 
explaining the industry standard criteria upon which a grocery store like Harmons qualifies as a neighborhood 
use. On February 3,1998, the city council heard comments from a Harmons representative, the Commission, 
and a few citizens. The comments were primarily positive, with just a couple citizens arguing that the 
development would not be compatible with the adjoining homes. 
P 7 After hearing the comments, the city council voted to deny Harmons's rezoning request, expressing 
concern about a 71,700 square foot, 24-hour store being considered because it is not in harmony 
with the Neighborhood Commercial useage [sic] of the area; the size and shape of the property is 
not suited for a complex of the size proposed; and the increased traffic, child and family safety 
issues which have been raised have not been sufficiently resolved. 
One council member "added that on the east side of the street smaller scale commercial has been approved 
and, if the Council designates this area for C-2 commercial development, too many things are allowed in a C-2 
zone that are not compatible with residential neighborhoods." 
1(38 I agree with Harmons that the trial court incorrectly selected the "reasonably debatable" standard of review 
to apply in upholding the city council's decision. I believe the trial court should instead have applied the 
"substantial evidence" standard and concluded the evidence did not meet that standard. 
ANALYSIS 
A. Interpreting Arbitrary and Capricious Standard 
1J39 Harmons argues the trial court incorrectly selected the law applicable to this case when it used the 
reasonably debatable criterion as the arbitrary and capricious standard under Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(3) 
(b) (1999). Harmons contends that the correct criterion is substantial evidence. I agree. 
1J40 Before the briefs were submitted in this case, the Utah Supreme Court had already decided this exact 
issue in Sprinqville Citizens for a Better Community v. City of Springville. 1999 UT 25, 979 P.2d 332.1 am 
disconcerted that counsel for both parties elected to completely ignore Springville Citizens in their briefing, thus 
not giving us the benefit of any analysis. Similarly, my colleagues have sought to avoid or wiggle free from the 
direct precedential effect of Springville Citizens. Despite the negative policy implications flowing from that 
decision, I believe we are compelled by stare decisis to follow the supreme court's "clearQ command." 
1J41 The majority opinion seeks to distinguish Springville Citizens from the instant case on the basis that 
Springville Citizens involved the review of an administrative decision (thus warranting review under the 
substantial evidence standard applied there), while the instant case involves the review of a legislative decision 
(thus warranting review under the reasonably debatable standard applied in past Utah cases). Such a 
mischaracterization of Springville Citizens requires wily maneuvering around the facts and law set forth there. 
1f42 The majority opinion specifically tries to distinguish Springville Citizens on three bases: (1) Past case law 
(predating Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 (effective May 1,1992) and Springville Citizens) supports the majority 
opinion. (2) The majority opinion describes the city council's decision in Springville Citizens as entailing the 
approval of a planned unit development (PUD), as opposed to an actual rezoning. And, (3) the majority opinion 
depicts Springville Citizens as involving merely a challenge to the city council's failure to follow its own 
mandatory ordinances, as opposed to the city council's failure to show evidentiary support for its decision. 
1. The Effect of Past Case Law 
1J43 I agree with the main opinion that under majority rule in the United States and past Utah law 
administrative-type decisions have traditionally been reviewed under a higher standard, akin to substantial 
evidence, while legislative-type decisions have traditionally been reviewed under a lower standard, akin to 
reasonably debatable. And, greater deference is generally given to legislative decisions because public policy 
suggests that the judiciary should not substitute its judgment for that of a legislative body serving at the 
pleasure of the citizenry. This is a solid, appealing argument. 
1f44 However, past law and public policy should no longer matter to this court. We can cite and expound on 
past case law and public policy ad infinitum without affecting one whit the state of the law as it exists today. 
Although we had extensive case law in 1991 stating different standards of review for administrative and 
legislative land use decisions, the Legislature enacted a one-size-fits-all standard of review for "municipaiO land 
use decisions" when it passed section 10-9-1001. This statute states, "The courts shall: (a) presume that land 
use decisions and regulations are valid; and (b) determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, 
capricious, or illegal." Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(3) (1999). 
1J45 The supreme court took this broad language at face value in Springville Citizens, in not questioning 
whether the Legislature may have intended two different standards of review to arise from that single standard. 
(18
^ The supreme court did not distinguish between city councils' administrative and legislative functions in 
Springville Citizens. Instead, the court accepted the Legislature's plain language without reservation, making 
the sweeping statement that "[a] municipality's land use decision is arbitrary and capricious if it is not supported 
by substantial evidence." Springville Citizens, 1999 UT 25,1f 2 4 . ^ 
1f46 Regardless, then, of our own views of the policy difficulties suggested by this statement and our affection 
for past case law, our only recourse as a lower appellate court is to state and apply the law as most recently 
declared by our supreme court. The statute, see Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 (1999), followed by the supreme 
court's definitive interpretation of that statute in Sprinqville Citizens, now supersedes any prior law recognizing 
a difference in the standards of review for city councils' administrative versus legislative actions. 
2. PUD Approval Versus Rezoning 
1J47 The majority opinion makes much of its assertion that Springville Citizens involved the approval of a PUD 
"rather than the reclassification of the zoning district." The majority regards the approval of a PUD to be 
administrative, while acknowledging that rezoning is a classic legislative activity. I have a few responses to this 
viewpoint 
fl48 First, without even considering further facts from Springville Citizens, my research reveals that PUD 
approval alone is widely regarded to be a legislative function. See, e.g., Stokes v. City of Mishawaka. 441 
N.E.2d 24, 28 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (deeming legislative city council's decision to approve application to zone 
land for PUD); State ex rel. Helujon. Ltd. v. Jefferson County. 964 S.W.2d 531, 535-36 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) 
(stating approval of PUD classification is legislative zoning decision); Todd Mart, Inc. v. Town Bd. of Webster, 
370 N.Y.S.2d 683, 689 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975) (noting "[a] majority o f . . . jurisdictions [considering this question] 
hold that the secondary determination, whether to approve a particular planned unit development district, is a 
legislative function exercised by the local zoning authority"); Harrison v. City of Kettering. No. 12728,1991 
Ohio App. LEXIS 4911, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 8,1991) ("[Ajpproval of a PUD plan is a legislative activity."); 
Lutz v. City of Longview, 520 P.2d 1374,1376 (Wash. 1974) (stating, in analyzing legal effect of approving 
PUD for certain parcel of land, "[t]he authorities are clear that such a change in permitted uses is a rezone or 
amendment of the zoning ordinance!/,] '[t]he end product is, of course, an amendment to the zoning ordinance 
which reclassifies the land in question'" (citation omitted)). But see South Creek Assocs. v. Bixby & Assocs.. 
Inc., 781 P.2d 1027, 1032 n.8 (Colo. 1989) ("Although the enactment of a PUD enabling ordinance is a 
legislative function, the process of reviewing a particular PUD plan for approval is 'administrative or 
adjudicative in nature' . . . . " (Citation omitted.)). 
1f49 However, even assuming the distinction between a PUD approval and a garden variety rezoning was 
implicitly important to the supreme court in setting forth the substantial evidence standard of review, if we dig 
deeper into the fact scenario underlying Springville Citizens, we see a city council decision that has all the 
characteristics of a legislative decision, not an administrative one. Approval of the PUD resulted in an 
ordinance amending the zoning map-the land at issue was rezoned to a classification that would 
accommodate the PUD. SeeSpringville Citizens for a Better Community v. City of Springville. 1999 UT 25, fflf 
2, 10, 979 P.2d 332; 2 Kenneth H. Young, Anderson's American Law of Zoning § 11.11, at 461 n.14(4thed. 
1996) (noting "[z]oning ordinance which reclassified land . . . to planned development is a legislative act"); see, 
e.g., Native Sun/Lyon Communities v. City of Escondido. 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 344, 355 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) ("It is 
the settled law of this state 'that zoning ordinances, whatever the size of the parcel affected, are legislative 
acts.'"); Fondren N. Renaissance v. Mayor and City Council of Jackson. No. 1998-CA-01515-SCT, 1999 Miss. 
LEXIS 331, at *5-6,14 (Miss. Oct. 21, 1999) (reviewing as legislative city council's decision to approve specific 
tract for PUD). 
T|50 Obviously, this is all unpersuasive to my colleagues. Their opinion seems so invested in the policy 
considerations flowing from the labeling of the city council's decision as administrative, instead of legislative, 
that it will not allow the law or the facts of Springville Citizens to interfere. Although the majority opinion 
concedes that "some authorities . . . conclude that PUD approval is a legislative act," it further observes "that 
those authorities . . . went on to apply the highly deferential fairly debatable review appropriate to legislative 
acts." However, assuming for a moment that no Utah case, including Springville Citizens, tells us whether Utah 
law considers PUD approvals legislative, it is inescapable that the majority of authorities do. That those same 
authorities go "on to apply the highly deferential fairly debatable review" is entirely inconsequential because our 
supreme court did not. It applied the substantial evidence standard, regardless of whether one makes the 
argument the decision reviewed was administrative or legislative. 
1J51 Aside from that, I believe that Springville Citizens is good precedent for the proposition that Utah does 
recognize PUD approvals (at least those involving an amendment to the zoning map) as legislative. The 
citizens group in Springville Citizens had wanted to appeal the city council's decision approving the PUD to a 
board of adjustment under Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-9-703 and 10-9-704(1 )(a) (1999). See Springville Citizens for 
a Better Community v. City of Springville. No. 960400547, slip op. at 16-17 (Dist. Ct. Utah Sept. 5, 1997). 
However, the city disagreed, "asserting that the board of adjustment is not empowered to hear appeals from 
zoning decisions made by the city council." jd. at 17. The district court concurred with the city: 
In this case the city council approved an ordinance amending the city zoning map. That is a 
legislative action by a legislative body-the city council-as to which the board of adjustment has 
no appellate jurisdiction. I am persuaded that plaintiffs did not have a right to appeal to the board 
of adjustment from what they considered an adverse decision by the city council. 
jdL at 17 (emphasis added). 
1J52 When the citizens group appealed this decision to the supreme court, along with the other issues in 
Springville Citizens, the supreme court stated: 
As to section 10-9-703, the district court simply concluded that plaintiffs could not appeal the 
overall approval of the P.U.D. to the board of adjustments; this, however, overlooked the nature 
of plaintiffs1 claims under that section, namely, that certain City actions apart from the final P.U.D, 
approval were appealable to the board of adjustments, i.e., the City's issuance of building permit 
03675 and the recording of Plat 4. 
Springville Citizens, 1999 UT 25, fl 32 (emphasis added). Thus, the supreme court agreed with the district 
court that final PUD approval was not an administrative council action appealable to a board of adjustment, in 
this Utah case, the supreme court sanctioned the district court's ruling that the final PUD approval was 
legislative. 
1f53 Finally, to support the assertedly meaningful distinction that Springville Citizens involved the approval of a 
PUD "rather than the reclassification of the zoning district," the majority opinion focuses on the portion of the 
property zoned H-1, which permitted PUD development but not subdivision development. The main opinion 
states, "The developer thus did not require a new zoning classification but rather required approval for a 
proposed PUD under the existing zoning classification." This patently ignores the facts of Springville Citizens. 
TJ54 Before the PUD approval, the bulk of the land at issue had been primarily zoned RA-1-20,000, a residential 
agricultural zone, "permitting homes on lots having a minimum of 20,000 square feet." Springville Citizens, No. 
960400547, slip op. at 3. The small remainder of the parcel was zoned H-1, which only allows the use of 
"single family homes located in a PUD." \± at 3. Mischaracterizing the facts, the majority opinion implies that 
the whole parcel was zoned to accommodate PUDs-which the majority opinion takes to mean that the zoning 
ordinance passed by the Springville City Council did not rezone the property. 
1J55 Unless the only part of the property being used for the PUD was the small remainder of the parcel zoned 
H-1, the Springville ordinance amending the zoning map necessarily effected a rezoning. After all, the 
residential agricultural zone did not include PUDs. Although Springville Citizens does not explicitly state which 
portion of the property was to be used for the PUD, I believe that the area zoned residential agricultural was at 
least partially rezoned to allow the PUD. I infer this from the fact that the residential agricultural zone required 
lot sizes to be a minimum of 20,000 square feet. And, one of the conditions that the city council had placed on 
its final approval of the PUD application was to "allowQ four of the lots to have less than 20,000 square feet but 
not less than 17,000 square feet." Springville Citizens. 1999 UT 25, If 9. Thus, it seems that at least four of the 
lots were to be drawn from the larger residential agricultural a r e a ^ 
1J56 I am therefore unpersuaded by the majority's assertion that categorizing the city council's action as a PUD 
approval, as opposed to a rezoning, is a meaningful distinction between Springville Citizens and the instant 
case. 
3. Review of Procedural Defects 
1J57 I disagree that Springville Citizens was purely a review of procedural defects regarding the city council's 
adherence to procedures mandated by city ordinances. To the contrary, immediately following the supreme 
court's enunciation of the substantial evidence criterion for reviewing a municipality's land use decision, the 
court proceeded in paragraph twenty-five to substantively review the facts in the record to determine whether 
the city council's decision to approve the PUD application was arbitrary and capricious under section 10-9-
1001, using the substantial evidence standard. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 (1999); Springville Citizens 
for a Better Community v. City of Springville. 1999 UT 25, fflj 24-25, 979 P.2d 332. After that paragraph, the 
opinion turned to a separate examination of whether the city council's decision was illegal under section 10-9-
1001, at which point the court reviewed the procedural irregularities in the approval process involving the city 
council's noncompliance with city ordinances. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 (1999); Springville Citizens. 
1999 UT 25, Tffl 26-30.1 therefore see in this point no useful tool for differentiating Springville Citizens from our 
case. 
1J58 Based on the above discussion, I believe Springville Citizens is directly on point with the instant case. With 
this precedent in place, I have no choice but to agree with Harmons that the arbitrary and capricious standard 
requires a review of the record for substantial evidence supporting the city council's denial of Harmons's 
rezoning application. In my view, the trial court incorrectly reviewed the record under a reasonably debatable 
criterion. 
B. Substantial Evidence Review of Record 
1f59 Having established my position that the substantial evidence standard should be applied in reviewing the 
Draper City Council's decision, I now analyze the record in this case to determine whether the city council's 
decision was arbitrary and capricious under the substantial evidence standard. 
1J60 Using the substantial evidence standard, I will "review the evidence in the record to ensure that the City 
proceeded within the limits of fairness and acted in good faith." Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. 
City of Springville. 1999 UT 25, ^  24, 979 P.2d 332.1 also must decide if, in view of aH the evidence before the 
city council, reasonable minds could arrive at the same conclusion as the city council did. See id. at 336-37; 
Patterson v. Utah County Bd. of Adjustment. 893 P.2d 602, 604 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Still, I will not weigh the 
evidence afresh or insert my judgment in place of the municipality's. See Springville Citizens. 1999 UT 25, If 
24; Patterson. 893 P.2d at 604. Substantial evidence is "'more than a mere "scintilla" of evidence . . . though 
"something less than the weight of the evidence.""' Patterson, 893 P.2d at 604 n.6 (citations omitted). 
1J61 To begin my review, I again recite the city council's reasons for its decision: (1) "concern about a 71,700 
square foot, 24-hour store being considered because it is not in harmony with the Neighborhood Commercial 
useage [sic] of the area"; (2) "the size and the shape of the property is not suited for a complex of the size 
proposed"; (3) "the increased traffic, child and family safety issues which have been raised have not been 
sufficiently resolved"; and (4) because "on the east side of the street smaller scale commercial has been 
approved . . . , if the Council designates [the property] for C-2 commercial development, too many things are 
allowed in a C-2 zone that are not compatible with residential neighborhoods." 
1[62 I now review the evidence in the record supporting each of these four reasons. First, I address the 
council's fear that a grocery store of the size and hours proposed would not fit a neighborhood commercial use. 
(The development was planned to be about 100,000 square feet of building space on 10.277 acres.) The 
record evidence overwhelmingly suggests just the opposite of the council's fear: The planning commission 
stated in its January 2,1998 staff report that "the proposed uses, if appropriately designed for the site, are 
consistent with the purpose of the proposed zoning."^1* The certified appraiser's report quotes an appraising 
treatise stating that a grocery store fits the definition of neighborhood commercial. The planning commission 
cited industry standard criteria for neighborhood commercial usage showed an expectation that such a usage 
would involve about 30,000-100,000 square feet per 5-7 acres, while community commercial runs about 
100,000-300,000 square feet per 10-30 acres. Thus, the planning commission noted that this development is 
toward the top of neighborhood commercial and the very bottom of community commercial. The planning 
commission staff report, dated January 30,1998, also quoted the Urban Land Institute's Shopping Center 
Development Handbook as stating, "In neighborhood shopping centers the supermarket is the key," and, "The 
Supermarket is the anchor tenant in traditional neighborhood centers." 
1J63 The sole contrary evidence in the record came from citizen Kent Cram who read the definition of mixed 
use areas into the record at a January 8,1998 planning commission meeting, concentrating on the language 
that mixed uses "promote day and evening use." He stated his opinion that the reference to day and evening 
use excludes "24-hour-a-day use." He further remarked, "[Although this area may be appropriate for 
commercial, a smaller scale use would respect the neighborhood character, and a 71,700-square-foot store . . 
. is not 'small scale.'" Planning commission staff immediately replied, "[T]his development fits within 'smaller 
scale,' because it will not be a huge center that will attract regional traffic." I would conclude that the 
unsupported opinion of a lone citizen with no known experience or training in these areas should hardly 
persuade a reasonable mind to choose that opinion over the extensive evidence from professional sources on 
the neighborhood commercial nature of this type of proposed development. Cf.Davis County v. Clearfield City. 
756 P.2d 704, 712 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (stating, in conditional use permit case using substantial evidence 
review under arbitrary and capricious standard, that m[c]itizen opposition is a consideration which must be 
weighed, but cannot be the sole basis for the decision to deny"' and local government entity '"must rely on 
facts, and not mere emotion or local opinion'" (citations omitted)). 
1J64 I next review the city council's concern that "the size and shape of the property is not suited for a complex 
of the size proposed." Again, the evidence most vehemently leads to the opposite conclusion. The planning 
commission staff report of January 2,1998 states, "The property, with the proposed conditions of approval, will 
be able to accommodate the proposed uses, if designed appropriately."^ Further, the January 30,1998 staff 
report quotes page forty-two of the Shopping Center Development Handbook which recommends that 
[a]s a rule of thumb for checking the adequacy of site area for a shopping center, one can figure 
roughly 10,000 square feet of building area and 30,000 square feet of parking area for each 
40,000 square feet (about one acre) of site area. For example a site of 10 acres for conventional 
shopping center development will readily accommodate 100,000 square feet of building area in 
the center. 
The staff report thus made the following conclusion about the adequacy of the site area: "The proposed site is 
10.27 acres in size and the gross leasable area (GLA) is 101,500 square feet. At a ratio of 1,000 square feet 
per acre, the square footage of the proposed structures appears to be in line with the size of the property." 
1f65 Meanwhile, the sole evidence suggesting otherwise was again Mr. Cram's opinion. He stated at the 
January 8, 1998 planning commission meeting that "the size and shape of this property is not suited for a 
complex of this size." While Mr. Cram is certainly entitled to his opinion, as I have stated, such an 
unsubstantiated assertion from a citizen with no known experience or training in this field cannot hold up to the 
learned conclusion of the planning commission, based on a professional treatise. See id. I would therefore hold 
that, based on the evidence in the record, a reasonable mind would not have endorsed Mr. Cram's opinion 
over that of the planning commission. 
1f66 I now visit the third reason given by the city council: "the increased traffic, child and family safety issues 
which have been raised have not been sufficiently resolved." Mr. Cram is also the one who raised these 
potential trouble areas.*22* Regarding traffic problems, he said 
he has been advised the children living in Camden Park will be attending school at Sprucewood 
Elementary, which is located at approximately 1000 East and 12000 South. Children from 
Camden Park will have to cross 700 East to get to school, and parents are very concerned their 
safety will be compromised because of the increased traffic. In addition, residents feel accessing 
their subdivision will be more difficult because of the increased traffic. 
Again, Mr. Cram did not corroborate his opinion-e.g., with evidence from school administrators or police traffic 
officers about the possibility that school children could be placed in jeopardy by the increase in traffic caused 
by the development. Further, Mr. Cram presented no traffic studies or evidence from police traffic officers or 
other experts showing how subdivision residents could perhaps be harmed by the increased traffic. 
1J67 In contrast, the record is replete with evidence showing the increased traffic from the development would 
not substantially affect the area. For instance, Harmons commissioned a traffic study of the intersection at 
issue by transportation consultants Fehr & Peers Associates. The Fehr & Peers report concluded that forty-five 
percent of the traffic would be "pass-by trips''*2^ that would not "affect traffic volumes at the access locations." 
The report further states that "[t]he intersection currently operates efficiently and will continue to operate 
effectively with the proposed development." At the planning commission meeting, planners noted that 11400 
South has been "master planned for several years to be [a] 106-foot rightQ-of-way (five lanes, two in each 
direction with a turning lane)." Thus, the evidence showed that the area was designated to be high traffic. In its 
January 30,1998 staff report, the planning commission again quoted the Shopping Center Development 
Handbook which discusses typical types of access for each type of commercial development. The Handbook 
states that "[neighborhood centers are located for access from collector streets. The location must avoid 
having minor residential service streets as its principal access for automobile traffic." The planning commission 
thus determined that M[t]he location of the project on 11400 South and 700 East, both streets designed to be 
major collectors, lends the site to a neighborhood or community commercial type development." 
[^68 Regarding potential child and family safety issues, according to the record, the only source for the city 
council's concern was again Mr. Cram who stated at the January 8,1998 planning commission meeting that 
"not only will a complex of this type encourage teen-age loitering and vandalism, but it will bring crime into the 
area as well." The following excerpt from the meeting's minutes shows Mr. Cram's effort to back up his opinion: 
To support his position, Mr. Cram gave the Commissioners a copy of a newspaper article which 
appeared in the Deseret News stating violent activities done by members of the Straight Edge 
movement are occurring, among other places, in shopping center parking lots. Mr. Cram then 
passed out a report obtained from the Roy City Police Department detailing the crimes that have 
taken place at the Roy City Harmons during 1997. He said there was a total of 259 crimes 
reported, with the most serious being a kidnaping and rape. 
The record contains no other evidence about family safety or likelihood of increased crime in the area because 
of the development. Mr. Cram did not present information from the local police department about the activity 
level of Straight Edgers in the area, nor did he present information about crimes reported at grocery stores in 
the same county as Draper, let alone grocery stores in the same city. I am not convinced that a reasonable 
mind would accept these vague and distant reports as persuasive evidence of crime and safety issues that 
might occur at the particular site should it be developed as proposed. 
1J69 Based on the above discussion, I would conclude that there is not substantial evidence in the record to 
support the city council's reasoning that "increased traffic, child and family safety issues which have been 
raised have not been sufficiently resolved." 
Tf70 Finally, I address the city council's concern that "on the east side of the street smaller scale commercial 
has been approved and, if the Council designates [the property] for C-2 commercial development, too many 
things are allowed in a C-2 zone that are not compatible with residential neighborhoods." I have scoured the 
record for evidence about this matter, but found not one shred of information to review. Consequently, I must 
conclude that the record would not support reasonable minds in relying on this reason. 
TJ71 Based on my review of the record regarding each reason the city council gave for its denial of Harmons's 
rezoning request, I would conclude the decision is not supported by substantial evidence. I would thus 
conclude the city council's decision was arbitrary and capricious under Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 (3)(b) 
(1999). 
CONCLUSION 
Tf72 I would hold that the arbitrary and capricious standard under Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 (3)(b) (1999) 
requires a review of the record for substantial evidence. I believe the trial court was thus incorrect in 
enunciating and applying the reasonably debatable criterion to the city council's decision. Based on the 
undisputed facts in the record, I would further conclude that the council's decision is not sustained by 
substantial evidence in the record. Because the decision would therefore be arbitrary and capricious, I would 
reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment for Draper and remand for further proceedings consistent 
with this dissent. 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
1. The stated purpose of the proposed C-2 Neighborhood Commercial District is: 
To provide areas, in appropriate locations where convenience buying outlets may be established 
to serve surrounding residential neighborhoods. The regulations of this district are designed to 
promote a combination of retail and service facilities, which in character and scale, are necessary 
to meet day-to-day needs of area residents. 
Staff Report to Draper Planning Commission, Draper Gateway Zone Change and Conditional Use Permit, at 2 
(Jan. 2, 1998). 
2. Concurrent with its rezoning application, Harmon also applied for a conditional use permit. At the time the 
planning commission voted to recommend that the city council approve the rezoning request, the commission 
also voted to approve the conditional use permit. During the meeting at which the city council considered the 
rezoning, an appeal of the planning commission's aproval of the conditional use permit was also on the 
agenda. However, when the city council rejected the rezoning request, the council declined to consider the 
appeal of the conditional use permit because the permit depended on the rezoning. 
3. "Although [section 10-9-1001] expressly applies only to the district court, 'the standard for our review . . . is 
the same standard established in the Utah Code for the district court's review.'" Brown v. Sandy City Bd. of 
Adjustment. 957 P.2d 207, 210 n.5 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied. 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1998) (quoting Patterson v. 
Utah County Bd. of Adjustment. 893 P.2d 602, 603 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)); see also Springville Citizens for a 
Better Community v. City of Sprinqville. 1999 UT 25,1J22, 979 P.2d 332. 
4. See, e.g.. Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake City. 685 P.2d 1032,1035 (Utah 1984) (reviewing 
decision by board of adjustment under arbitrary and capricious standard); Gavland v. Salt Lake County, 11 
Utah 2d 307, 358 P.2d 633, 636 (1961) ("[l]t is the court's duty . . . not to interfere with the Commission's action 
unless i t . . . capriciously and arbitrarily infringes upon [property] rights."); Marshall v. Salt Lake City. 105 Utah 
111, 141 P.2d 704, 709 (1943) ("Unless the action of such body is arbitrary, discriminatory or unreasonable, or 
clearly offends some provision of the constitution or statute, the court must uphold it."). 
5. Compare Marshall. 141 P.2d at 709 (stating, in reviewing a legislative zoning action: "If a [zoning] 
classification is reasonably doubtful, the judgment of the court will not be substituted for the judgment of the 
city." (emphasis added)), with Xanthos. 685 P.2d at 1035 (stating that, in reviewing a board of adjustment's 
adjudicative action: "[The trial court's] role was limited to determining whether there was evidence in the record 
to support the Board of Adjustment's action." (emphasis added)). 
6. See Sandy City v. Salt Lake County. 827 P.2d 212, 221 (Utah 1992); see also Scherbel v. Salt Lake City 
Corp.. 758 P.2d 897, 899 (Utah 1988) ("the passage of general zoning ordinances and the determination of 
zoning policy [are] properly vested in the legislative branch."); Gavland. 358 P.2d at 635-36 ("In pursuing its 
authority to zone, . . . the Commission is performing a legislative function."). Additionally, the legislative process 
is inherently political in nature and requires a legislative body to broadly weigh the interests of all concerned in 
furtherance of the general welfare. See, e.g.. Marshall. 141 P.2d at 709-10 (noting varied interests considered 
in creating zoning plan). 
7. In Walker v. Brigham City. 856 P.2d 347 (Utah 1993), the supreme court said that a municipality's legislative 
decision would be upheld under the arbitrary and capricious standard unless "wholly discordant to reason and 
justice." ] d at 349. In Crestview-Holladay Homeowners Ass'n v. Engh Floral Co.. 545 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1976), 
the supreme court, reviewing a challenge to a rezoning by the Salt Lake County Commission, observed that "[i] 
n the review of zoning cases the function of the court is narrow and its scope is limited to a determination of 
whether or not the action of the Board of County Commissioners as a legislative body is illegal, arbitrary, or 
capricious." \_± at 1151-52. The court deferred to the legislative body and upheld the rezoning as enacted 
"pursuant to a planning scheme developed for that portion of the county." \_cL at 1152. The supreme court 
likewise upheld a rezoning, this one passed by a municipality's legislative body, in Navlor v. Salt Lake City 
Corp.. 17 Utah 2d 300, 410 P.2d 764 (1966). In Naylor, the court stated that the city's action was not arbitrary 
and capricious unless "there is no reasonable basis whatsoever to justify it." ]cL at 766. 
8. See, e.g.. Xanthos. 685 P.2d at 1035 (court's role under arbitrary and capricious standard is "determining 
whether there was evidence in the record to support the Board of Adjustment's action"); Davis County v. 
Clearfield City. 756 P.2d 704, 708 n.5, 711 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (where city council sits as a board of 
adjustment, decision to deny conditional use permit is arbitrary where reasons for denial lack sufficient factual 
basis). 
9. For example, Brown v. Sandy City Board of Adjustment. 957 P.2d 207 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), reviews a 
municipal board of adjustment's administrative interpretation of the municipality's zoning ordinance. See id. at 
208. Likewise, Wells v. Board, of Adjustment of Salt Lake City Corp.. 936 P.2d 1102 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), 
reviews a board of adjustment's decision denying a zoning variance. See id. at 1103; see also First Nat'l Bank 
of Boston v. County Bd. of Equalization of Salt Lake County. 799 P.2d 1163, 1164 (Utah 1990) (reviewing 
administrative evaluation for property tax purposes); Chambers v. Smithfield City. 714 P.2d 1133,1134 (Utah 
1986) (reviewing administrative procedures for processing zoning variance requests); Xanthos. 685 P.2d at 
1033 (reviewing board of adjustments' denial of zoning variance); Patterson. 893 P.2d at 603 (reviewing county 
board of adjustment's approval of special exception to zoning ordinance); Davis County. 756 P.2d at 705 
(reviewing city council's denial of conditional use permit). 
10. If the Sprinqville Citizens decision represented the clear departure from prior precedent that is claimed in 
the dissent, even if that departure were necessitated by legislative enactment, it would be extraordinary, 
indeed, for the court not to say so and to explain in some detail why such an unprecedented result was in 
order. We find it instructive that there is no such discussion in the opinion. 
11. The dissent suggests that Springville Citizens involved a zoning reclassification because part of the land at 
issue in that case was zoned RA-1-20,000, a classification permitting only residential and agricultural uses. 
The remainder of the land was classified H-1. In its slip opinion, the district court surmised that the developers 
chose to develop the land as a PUD rather than a subdivision because, under its present classification, land 
zoned H-1 could be developed as a PUD but not as a subdivision. See Springville Citizens for a Better 
Community v. City of Springville. No. 960400547, slip op., at 3-4 & n.6 (Dist. Ct. Utah Sept. 5, 1997). Thus the 
H-1 zoning classification was more restrictive than the RA-1-20,000 classification; the latter could have been 
developed as either a PUD or a subdivision, but the former could be developed only as a PUD. The developer 
therefore did not require a new zoning classification but rather required approval for the proposed PUD under 
the existing zoning classification. 
In any event, in interpreting Springville Citizens, we do not think it proper to look beyond the facts relied upon 
by the supreme court in its published opinion, which makes no reference to either zoning classification. 
12. See, e.g.. State ex rel. Helujon. Ltd. v. Jefferson County. 964 S.W.2d 531, 536 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) 
(reviewing PUD approval under arbitrary and capricious standard, "meaning . . . fairly debatable"); see also 
Native Sun/Lvon Communities v. City of Escondido. 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 344, 354 (Cal Ct. App. 1993) ("It is the 
settled law of this state 'that zoning ordinances, whatever the size of the parcel affected, are legislative acts.' 
Legislative acts, of course, do not require findings." (emphasis added; citations omitted)). 
13. Compare Todd Mart. Inc. v. Town Bd. of Webster. 370 N.Y.S. 2d 683, 689-90 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975) 
(holding PUD approval legislative because municipality's discretion under PUD enabling ordinance was no less 
broad than its discretion under statute), with McCallen v. City of Memphis. 786 S.W.2d 633, 639 (Tenn. 1990) 
(holding PUD approval administrative because PUD enabling ordinance limited city council's discretion over 
PUD approval). 
14. We do admit that Sprinqville Citizens can reasonably be read otherwise. However, we conclude that, 
because the nature of the claim in Springville Citizens is less than clear, we should read Springville Citizens' 
application of the standard of review as consistent with longstanding Utah common law and as supported by 
good public policy, rather than as a dramatic break from prior precedent where no such intention is expressed 
in the opinion. 
15. Nor should "public clamor" be equated with public comment. "Clamor" is a more subjective term, connoting 
a degree of irrationality or emotion. See Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 414 (1993) (defining "clamor" as 
"the loud and continued uproar of many human voices[;] a loud continued and usu[ally] confused noise"). Its 
synonyms include hubbub, rumpus, tumult, and din. See id. 
16. Harmon's argument fails for the additional reason that, through this suit, it seeks to enforce Draper's master 
plan. By statute, a city's master plan is advisory unless made mandatory by the city. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-
9-303(6) (1999). Harmon has not argued that the Draper master plan is mandatory and not advisory. We might 
reach a different conclusion had Draper legislatively limited its discretion in zoning matters by making its 
master plan mandatory. Cf. Sprinqville Citizens. 1999 UT25, HU28-30, 979 P.2d 332 (holding municipality 
bound to follow its own mandatory ordinances). 
17. The General Plan describes Mixed Use (Planned Development) zoning as follows: 
The mixture of uses within this category should include master planned developments consisting 
of office, light manufacturing, retail, residential, and recreation and open space components. 
These areas are envisioned as providing for a compatible mix of residential and non-residential 
uses in well-planned activity centers, that promote day and evening use. The mix of land uses 
may vary from location to location. The size of individual projects may vary, however, each 
development must respect surrounding parcels 
Land Use Element, Draper, Utah, General Plan § 6(a) (1996). The General Plan further states: 
"Generally, the types of uses encouraged in [Mixed Use] areas include auto dealerships, 
corporate and speculative offices, lodging facilities, regional commercial centers, clean 
manufacturing facilities, a variety of residential densities, convention facilities, service retail, 
movie and live theaters, and other similar activities." \dL § 6(c). 
The General Plan specifically notes that the area around 700 East and 11400 South "would be appropriate for 
smaller-scale mix-use development which respects the neighborhood character within the area." ]d^ § 6(b). 
18. Although the policy argument that administrative decisions should be reviewed under a higher standard 
than legislative decisions makes good sense, it is also difficult to argue that the Legislature meant to 
encompass two different standards-substantial evidence for administrative decisions and fairly debatable for 
legislative decisions-by using the single term "arbitrary [and] capricious." In fact, the Mississippi Supreme 
Court went so far as to say: "'Fairly debatable' is the antithesis of arbitrary and capricious. If a decision could 
be considered fairly debatable then it could not be considered arbitrary or capricious." Fondren N. Renaissance 
v. Mavor and City Council of Jackson. No. 1998-CA-01515-SCT, 1999 Miss. LEXIS 331, at *6-7 (Miss. Oct. 21, 
1999). 
19. The majority opinion supports its analysis with the observation that the supreme court cited Patterson v. 
Utah County Board of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), a case involving the review of an 
administrative decision, in setting forth the substantial evidence standard in Springville Citizens. However, I do 
not see that as a basis for distinguishing Springville Citizens from the case at issue. After all, if-as I believe-
Springville Citizens stands for the proposition that both administrative and legislative decisions are to be 
reviewed under the substantial evidence standard, it does not matter from which kind of case the enunciation 
of the substantial evidence standard is cited. 
20. Even if the entire parcel had been zoned H-1, which would allow a PUD, authority exists stating that the city 
council's passage of an ordinance amending the zoning map and approving the PUD would still be legislative. 
See, e.g.. Native Sun/Lyon Communities v. City of Escondido, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 344, 355 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) 
(stating "'zoning ordinances, whatever the size of the parcel affected, are legislative acts'" (citation omitted)); 
Gray v. Trustees, Monclova Township, 313 N.E.2d 366, 369 (Ohio 1974) ("[T]he action of the board [of 
township trustees] in approving [a PUD] plat is the functional equivalent of traditional legislative zoning, even 
though the entire PUD area is covered by the same 'nominal' zoning classification both before and after 
approval of the plat."). 
21. The staff report says, "if appropriately designed for the site." This does not suggest that, once the rezoning 
occurred, Harmons could at its discretion either appropriately or inappropriately design its development to fit 
the site. If the rezoning had been approved, Harmons would still have had to jump through the hoops required 
by the conditional use permit and site plan approval processes. Presumably, at those critical points, the 
planning commission would ensure that the development was appropriately designed. 
22. Here, the planning commission staff refers to the conditions it planned to put on the conditional use permit. 
23. Two other citizens stated for the record that they believed the proposed Harmons development would 
increase traffic in the area. However, these two citizens did not voice any negative inferences regarding their 
perceptions that traffic would increase. 
24. The Fehr & Peers study defines "pass-by trips" as "vehicles that are already in the area, but are attracted 
from adjacent streets to the site due to the type of development." 
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This matter came before the Court upon Plaintiffs' and Defendant's cross Motions for 
Summary Judgment. Having received and considered the Motions, together with memoranda in 
support of and opposition to the Motions, the Court hereby grants Plaintiffs' Motion, denies 
Defendant's Motion, and delivers the following Memorandum Decision. 
Statement of Facts 
Plaintiffs applied to Payson City to change the zone of their property from R-l-A to R-
2-75. Upon initial review of the application, the Planning Commission Staff issued an interoffice 
memo to the Mayor and the City Council members recommending approval of the zone change 
and for the Planning Commission and the City Council to hold a joint public hearing on the 
matter. On March 20, 1996, a joint public hearing was held and several landowners in the area 
expressed their opinions concerning the proposed change. After the public hearing, the Planning 
Commission voted to recommend denial of the zone change based on the opinions expressed at 
the public hearing. The City Council then voted to deny the change based on: (1) how it would 
be contrary to the General Plan; (2) traffic concerns relating to the industrial park; and (3) the 
Planning Commission's recommendation. 
Opinion of the Court 
Summary judgment is proper only if there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." URCP 56(c). The Court must 
view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Higgins v. Salt Lake County. 
855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993). 
The Court may reverse the City Council's denial of the zone change if the "action taken 
was so unreasonable as to be arbitrary and capricious." Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment, 685 
P.2d 1032, 1034 (Utah 1984). "Even if the reasons given in the motion adopted by the council 
might otherwise be legally sufficient,... the denial of a permit is arbitrary when the reasons are 
without sufficient factual basis.... Citizen opposition is a consideration which must be weighed, 
but cannot be the sole basis for the decision to deny." Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 P.2d 
704, 711 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The Court believes that the standard set forth in Davis County, 
although that case involved a denial of an application for a conditional use permit instead of a 
zone change, involves the same legal analysis as this case. 
The Court finds that the City Council's decision to deny Plaintiffs' first application was 
arbitrary and capricious. The City Council stated that it based its decision on: (1) how the zone 
change would be contrary to the General Plan; (2) traffic concerns relating to the industrial park; 
and (3) the Planning Commission's recommendation. The stated reasons might normally be 
legally sufficient. However, they are without sufficient factual basis. The traffic concern was not 
a sufficient reason for the denial since there was no evidence before the City Council that the 
proposed zone change would in fact create traffic concerns. Also, there was no factual basis to 
rely on the Planning Commission's recommendation. The Planning Commission initially 
recommended approving the application and then changed its mind after the public hearing on 
March 20, 1996. The only reasons the Commission gave for its sudden reversal were the 
comments the neighbors made at the public hearing. Accordingly, the City Council's reliance on 
the Commission's recommendation was factually unfounded. Similarly, neither the Planning 
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Commission nor the City Council provided any factual basis for the reason that the zone change 
would be contrary to the General Plan. The Court notes that from the zoning maps provided to 
the Court it appears that there are already residentially zoned areas on the west side of the 1-15 
buffer. The mere fact that Plaintiffs' property is on the west side does not establish that it is 
contrary to the General Plan. 
There being no sufficient factual basis for the decision to deny Plaintiffs' application, the 
Court finds that the decision was based solely on citizen opposition and was therefore arbitrary 
and capricious. Having reversed the denial of the application for a zone change from R-l-A to 
R-2-75, the Court need not analyze the denial of the second application. 
Order 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. The zone change 
from R-l-A to R-2-75 is hereby approved. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
DATED this day of January, 1999. 
cc: Mark E. Arnold, Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Diana L. Garrett, Attorney for Plaintiffs 
David C. Tuckett, Attorney for Pay son City 
David L. Church, Attorney for Payson City 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
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Robert Bradley, Joyce Bradley, 
R. Dale Whitelock, Karma 
Whitelock, Louis Peterson and 
Barbara Peterson, 
Petitioners and 
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v. No. 20010233-SC 
990329-CA 
Payson City Corporation, 970400264 
Respondents and 
Cross-Petitioners. 
ORDER 
This matter is before the court upon a Petition and Cross-
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, filed pursuant to Rule 48, of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition and Cross-Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari filed on March 14, 2001, by petitioner is 
granted. 
FOR THE COURT: 
^ ^
 l
 *i ^ 0 / Date / Richard C. Howe 
Chief Justice 
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JODY K. BURNETT 
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